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 1 
Article 
THE MONSANTO LECTURE 
ONLINE DEFAMATION, LEGAL CONCEPTS, 
AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN 
Benjamin C. Zipursky 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was an honor to give the Monsanto Lecture at Valparaiso University 
Law School. Many prior Monsanto lecturers have utilized this 
opportunity to sketch important theoretical frameworks.  I have chosen to 
go in a different direction, one that is studiously down-to-earth.  The 
Article principally addresses questions regarding the publication element 
of the tort of libel and how the doctrine surrounding those questions 
ought to be applied to defamation cases that involve the Internet.  Most of 
today’s interesting problems in American defamation law involve a 
question about the interaction of a federal statutory provision, the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) § 230(c), with the common law of 
libel.  I argue that the failure to take the doctrinal structure of libel law 
seriously has led courts to mangle Internet defamation law, effectively 
eliminating—for the Internet only—a fundamental principle called “the 
republication rule.”1  This interpretation is alien from what Congress 
intended, from any reasonable reading of the relevant statutory text and 
from plausible public policy choices in the age of the Internet.  As Ninth 
Circuit Judge Ronald Gould cautioned: 
Congress wanted to ensure that excessive government 
regulation did not slow America’s expansion into the 
exciting new frontier of the Internet.  But Congress did 
not want this new frontier to be like the Old West: a 
lawless zone governed by retribution and mob justice.  
The CDA does not license anarchy.  A person’s decision 
                                                
 Professor of Law and James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University 
School of Law.  I am grateful to Anita Bernstein, Mark Geistfeld, John Goldberg, Clare 
Huntington, Thomas H. Lee, Ethan Leib, Robert Rabin, Aaron Saiger, Anthony Sebok, 
Catherine Sharkey, Kevin Stack, Olivier Sylvain, and audiences at Valparaiso University Law 
School and University of Western Ontario for helpful comments on previous drafts.  Auran 
Buckles has provided tremendous research assistance. 
1 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
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to disseminate the rankest rumor or most blatant 
falsehood should not escape legal redress merely because 
the person chose to disseminate it through the Internet 
rather than through some other medium.2  
This Article aims to set things right in a somewhat traditional way:  it 
elucidates a legal problem by identifying the relevant doctrinal 
framework within tort law, and it applies that doctrinal framework to the 
real world of facts and statutes and politics.  Its principal thesis is that 
§ 230 of the CDA—which is called “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material”—should be interpreted 
against the backdrop of both: (1) a variety of principles regarding the 
publication element of libel law; and (2) the numerous Good Samaritan 
statutes that have been enacted to modify the common law’s treatment of 
the “duty” element within state negligence law.  Like certain parts of 
negligence law, CDA § 230 (“§ 230”) relates to whether a company or 
individual ever has a duty to protect persons against perils that it (the 
company or individual) did not itself generate.  A striking decision by a 
single state trial court in the early 1990s caused a panic in the fledgling 
Internet industry because it seemed to create a common law Catch-22 for 
Internet service providers who try to protect families against obscenity on 
the Internet.3  Congress solved the problem with § 230 just the way that 
state legislatures have used Good Samaritan laws to eliminate the Catch-
22 for physicians who volunteer to rescue roadside accident victims.  
Notwithstanding what seems to be a direct message from Congress in the 
very naming of the statute, it turns out to have been difficult for courts 
and commentators alike to grasp its main point.  I am hopeful that, as a 
scholar who studies the range of tort law—from negligence to strict 
products liability to battery, fraud, and defamation—I may be able to shed 
light on this important question of statutory interpretation.  The 
unjustifiable abandonment of the republication rule for Internet cases is a 
consequence of courts’ failure to grasp the “Good Samaritan” aspects of 
§ 230 and the concepts of affirmative duty that such a framework imports 
into libel law. 
While friends and colleagues will not be surprised by my decision to 
focus on libel law in this Article (defamation and privacy within tort law 
                                                
2 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir.) (Gould, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), rehearing denied, 351 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 
(2004) (holding that a republisher was immune under the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”) § 230). 
3 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (treating the Internet service provider (“ISP”) as the publisher 
of a defamatory posting by a third party). 
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have long been a personal passion), some would be incredulous if I 
disclaimed all theoretical pretensions.  They would be at least partially 
right, for the theoretical positions I have advocated over the past two 
decades do lie behind the interpretive arguments I put forward here.  In 
the end, I shall suggest that the problems courts have faced in CDA 
interpretation are symptoms of larger shortcomings in the theoretical and 
methodological assumptions that many judges and lawyers today bring 
to their analysis of legal questions.  Sorting out § 230 requires taking legal 
concepts seriously:  publication, active/passive distinctions, Good 
Samaritan ideas, affirmative duties, republication, and so on.  Twentieth 
century tort scholars gave American judges and lawyers one hundred 
years of anti-conceptual thinking, often contending that pragmatic thinkers 
should zip through the verbiage of the common law and get to the results 
that really matter.  The larger point of this Article is that reasonable and 
pragmatic legal interpretations often require just the opposite—an 
authentic engagement with common law principles and an intelligent 
construction of the case law and statutory provisions that emerge from 
and complement those principles.  In pointing out a wide range of tort 
claims that have been inadvertently snuffed out, I also aim to call attention 
to the importance of tort law as a mechanism through which individuals 
are afforded an avenue of civil recourse against those who wronged them.  
To some extent, then, the Article illustrates the pragmatic conceptualist 
and civil recourse views I have put forward over the past two decades, 
both individually and in conjunction with Professor John Goldberg.4  
Nothing here depends on acceptance of those theoretical views, however.5 
Part II provides the background of our topic.6  Part II.A briefly 
introduces the republication rule.  Next, Part II.B describes the key case—
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy—that led to the enactment of § 230.  Then Part 
II.C describes a path of decisions interpreting the CDA, leading us to a 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 458–59 
(2000) [hereinafter Zipursky, Pragmatic] (introducing pragmatic conceptualism); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82 (1998) 
(introducing civil recourse theory); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral 
of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1746–50 (1998) (developing responsibility-based, 
pragmatic, and conceptualistic accounts of the common law of torts, in the spirit of Cardozo 
as opposed to Holmes); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law, 42 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2008) (providing the Monsanto lecture touching upon pragmatic, 
conceptualistic, and responsibility-based themes in tort law). 
5 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Thinking in the Box in Legal Scholarship: The Good Samaritan and 
Internet Libel, 56 J. LEG. ED. 55 (2016).  In a recent essay for a symposium on the future of legal 
scholarship, I suggested that doctrinal and non-theoretical legal scholarship is too often 
overlooked.  Id.  That essay puts forward a highly condensed version of the CDA § 230 
(“§ 230”) analysis offered below. 
6 See infra Part II (reviewing multiple cases). 
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strikingly laissez-faire approach.  Finally, Part II.D sketches where we are 
today in Internet libel law.7  Part III explains that American courts have 
been interpreting § 230 without an adequate understanding of either the 
common law doctrines relating to the publication element of libel law or 
an adequate understanding of the Stratton Oakmont decision.8  These 
lacunae have led to a catastrophe in interpreting and applying § 230 since 
its passage.9 
Part IV uses the framework developed above to explain what has gone 
wrong in the interpretation of the § 230 and why, and Part IV offers an 
account of how that statute should be interpreted moving forward.10  Part 
V concludes by returning to the more theoretical theme of the Article—
that legal concepts matter.11 
II.  ONLINE DEFAMATION AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE REPUBLICATION 
RULE 
A. The Republication Rule 
For centuries, the common law of libel and slander contained a 
principle called “the republication rule.”12  It says that a speaker who 
writes or speaks a defamatory statement made by another is liable as if he 
or she were the speaker herself.13  As a general matter, it is immaterial 
whether the second speaker is reasserting the defamatory statement in her 
own voice or attributing it to the earlier speaker.14  Imagine a newspaper 
that publishes an op-ed by a Mr. Jim Smith saying “Clint Williams is a 
child molester,” or a neighborhood gossip who says, “Jim Smith said 
‘Clint Williams is a child molester.’”  The newspaper and the 
neighborhood gossips are, as a general matter, on the hook as if they were 
Jim Smith. 
The reasons for the republication rule are obvious.15  It is not simply 
that the same damage can be done to the plaintiff by the republisher 
                                                
7 See infra Part II (detailing the background of the tort of defamation). 
8 See infra Part III (analyzing the courts’ interpretations of § 230). 
9 See infra Part III (noting the impact of various interpretations of § 230). 
10 See infra Part IV (recommending a better method of interpretation). 
11 See infra Part V (discussing legal concepts and the common law). 
12 See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating 
republishing libel may create liability even when the statement is attributed to another 
publisher). 
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (summarizing the 
liability of those repeating defamatory statements). 
14 See id. (“It is not defense that the second publisher names the author or original 
publisher of the libel.”).  
15 See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[t]alebearers are as bad as 
talemakers”) (internal citations omitted).    
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(actually, often far greater harm is done by the repetition or the broad 
publication).16  It is that, absent such a rule, defamers could too easily 
sidestep any possible liability by putting words into another’s mouth.  
And remember that speaking or writing—including republication—is an 
intentional act, so republishers are aware when they are making the 
damaging statements.  An assailant does not avoid liability for battery 
because the idea was someone else’s and he was merely carrying through 
another’s intention.17 
To be sure, common law courts and legislatures have crafted 
intelligent limitations on the republication rule in cases where, for 
example, a newspaper is carrying a report of what was said in a city 
council meeting or a court.18 And, under the inspiration of New York Times 
v. Sullivan and its progeny, federal and state courts interpreting the First 
Amendment have created defenses that, directly or indirectly, blunt the 
impact of the republication rule in a range of cases, too.19  But—for the 
most part—the republication rule has remained in place before, during, 
and after the New York Times v. Sullivan era, and it remains in place today.20 
B. Cubby, Stratton Oakmont, and the Communications Decency Act 
Things have gone differently for Internet defamation, however.  In 
New York, California, and several federal circuits, the republication rule 
has been eviscerated.21  A person who posts a defamatory statement that 
was originally written by someone else is typically said to enjoy complete 
immunity from a defamation claim, even if the poster had actual malice, 
and regardless of whether it is an issue of public concern.22  On the 
Internet, the law of defamation (and various other speech torts, as well) 
has been sheared away for republishers, regardless of culpability, 
                                                
16 See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 61 (reasoning any different rule would generate expansive 
reputational harm without liability). 
17 See Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1148–50 (emphasizing the amount of authority stating that 
republishers should be held liable like the originator of the defamatory statement). 
18 See, e.g., Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 153 A.2d 36 (N.J. 1959) (recognizing the defense 
of fairly and accurately reporting statement made in town meeting); see also e.g., Hahn v. 
Holum, 162 N.W. 432 (Wis. 1917) (shielding the true and fair reporting of official proceeding). 
19 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 710, 739 (1964). 
20 See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, “Defamation Live”: The Confusing Legal 
Landscape of Republication in Live Broadcasting and a Call for a “Breaking News Doctrine”, 39 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2016) (recognizing the persistence of the republication rule and 
calling for revision of doctrine with regard to live broadcasts). 
21  Infra Parts II.C and II.D. 
22 See, e.g., infra Part II.D. (describing breadth of protection in today’s Internet law). 
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knowledge, intention, or effect, and regardless of whether the original 
defamer can be found.23 
Two cases from New York began the sequence of events that brought 
us to where we are.  The first—Cubby v. Compuserve—was quite 
unremarkable.24  A plaintiff sued an Internet service provider because one 
of the virtual periodicals carried in its online libraries allegedly contained 
a statement defaming the plaintiff.25  Judge Peter Leisure, in the Southern 
District of New York, determined that Compuserve was more like a 
library, bookstore, or newsstand than a newspaper, and summed this up 
by saying Compuserve was more like a distributor than a publisher.26  
Distributors—unlike publishers—cannot be held accountable in libel for 
the contents of writings they lend, sell, or distribute, at least if they lack 
notice of its defamatory content.27  Judge Leisure, therefore, granted 
Compuserve’s summary judgment motion on the ground that it was not 
a publisher.28 
Two years later, a controversial securities brokerage firm sued the 
internet service provider (“ISP”) Prodigy in a New York state trial court 
in Nassau County on Long Island.29  An electronic bulletin board carried 
on Prodigy contained a pseudonymous posting asserting the securities 
brokerage was engaged in fraud.30  The plaintiff’s lawyers in this case were 
not deterred by Cubby because they had found overstated marketing 
material by Prodigy in which it touted its ability to filter and edit content, 
                                                
23 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328–30 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to hold an 
online publisher liable for defamation or negligence, even though the original defamer could 
not be found). 
24 See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(illustrating that an action was brought for libel, business disparagement, and unfair 
competition). 
25 See id. at 137–38 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s defamation claim). 
26 See id. at 139–40 (finding CompuServe was not a publisher). 
27 See id. at 139 (explaining the higher standard of liability for publishers as opposed to 
distributors). 
28 See id. at 135, 145 (holding CompuServe functioned more like a distributor than a 
publisher). 
29 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (noting the cause of action); see also Second Amended Verified 
Complaint at 2–3, Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (stating Stratton Oakmont’s president, Daniel 
Porush, was also a named plaintiff, and the named defendants included:  IBM, Sears 
Roebuck, alleged partners of Prodigy, and unidentified defendants, John Doe and Mary 
Doe).  The allegations in this complaint included assertions that unidentified employees of 
Prodigy were the users of the pseudonyms through which the postings were made; these 
allegations had been abandoned by the time Stratton Oakmont made its motion for partial 
summary judgment.  Id. 
30 See id. at 3 (claiming unidentified individuals made a pseudonymous posting asserting 
that Stratton Oakmont had committed fraud). 
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thereby declaring itself family-friendly.31 The firm aggressively 
characterized Prodigy as having admitted that it was—within the rubric 
of Cubby—a publisher, not a distributor.32  Moreover, Stratton Oakmont 
was able to point to the fact that Prodigy had actually hired someone to 
monitor the bulletin board on which the allegedly defamatory statement 
appeared, and that this person had failed to remove the statement.33  So 
confident was Stratton Oakmont—notwithstanding a prominent federal 
court having ruled as a matter of law for the defendant in the only similar 
case—that it moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether 
Prodigy could be held liable if the statement was found defamatory.34  
Stunningly, the trial judge in New York State court granted partial 
summary judgment, ruling that Prodigy was a publisher, as a matter of 
law, of statements that had been anonymously posted on its electronic 
bulletin board.35  Even though Prodigy hired new lawyers and moved for 
reconsideration, it was too late, for the trial judge was unwilling to change 
his mind.36 
It is, of course, not technically relevant that the controversial securities 
firm protecting its reputation in Prodigy was none other than Stratton 
Oakmont, best known today as the firm that was run by Jordan Belfort—
the so-called “Wolf of Wall Street.”37  We now know that public statements 
critical of Stratton Oakmont were sorely missing in 1994.38  It is more than 
a touch ironic that Stratton Oakmont’s right to protect its reputation is the 
source of American Internet defamation law today.39 
The ISP industry rushed to Washington in the weeks after Justice 
Stuart Ain’s decision, energetically lobbying Congress for federal 
protection against state judges like Ain.40  Congress devoted a provision 
                                                
31 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (describing Stratton Oakmont’s 
ability to filter and edit content). 
32 See id. at *4 (following the rubric of Cubby). 
33 See id. at *5–6 (explaining how Prodigy directed and controlled Epstein’s actions). 
34 See id. at *1 (moving for partial summary judgment). 
35 See id. at *4 (granting Stratton Oakmont’s motion for partial summary judgment). 
36 See id. at *1–2 (denying Prodigy’s motion for renewal). 
37 See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (denoting Stratton Oakmont as the plaintiff 
in the case); id. (establishing Stratton Oakmont as a party to the lawsuit); see also JORDAN 
BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET, 15 (2007) (detailing Jordan Belfort’s efforts in 
establishing the brokerage firm Stratton Oakmont).  The film version of the book—The Wolf 
of Wall Street—was a Hollywood blockbuster starring Leonardo DiCaprio. 
38 See BELFORT, supra note 37, at 54–55 (implying Stratton Oakmont had a good reputation 
among many individuals in the early 1990s). 
39 See Conor Clarke, How the Wolf of Wall Street Created the Internet, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_the_stratton_oakmont_ruling_that_helped_wri
te.html [https://perma.cc/HT2W-KG8D] (reporting Stratton Oakmont initiated a lawsuit 
that laid the legal foundation for governing Internet content). 
40 See id. (describing the reaction to the Stratton Oakmont decision in Washington). 
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of its then-in-progress telecommunications bill to overrule this little New 
York case and to make sure it was not followed nationally.41  One of the 
concerns quite rightly raised was that it was unrealistic to expect ISPs to 
review all of the postings on all of its bulletin boards and to determine 
which were true or false, defamatory or non-defamatory, and published 
negligently or not.42  Another was that a pattern of massive filtering and 
taking down of messages by ISPs—particularly if done in a defensive 
spirit—would hold back the Internet from fulfilling its potential and 
would represent a move in the wrong direction from a First Amendment 
point of view.43  Most specifically, Congress was profoundly troubled by 
the New York trial court’s willingness to treat the defendant as sort of 
“estopped” by its own partial censorship from pleading an inability to 
control what was online.44  The problem was that companies would 
therefore make sure to refrain from any form of control of obscenity.45  For 
all of these reasons, Congress inserted into the CDA what it called the 
“Good Samaritan” provision: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of-- 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
                                                
41 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012) (codifying the language of the bill’s final draft). 
42 See Clarke, supra note 39 (expressing Congress’s concerns over the Stratton Oakmont 
ruling). 
43 See CDA 230:  Legislative History, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/ 
cda230/legislative-history [https://perma.cc/7LDY-T4LR] (discussing additional concerns 
from Congress over ISP liability). 
44 See id. (referring to the Cox-Wyden Amendment to the CDA that was proposed in 
response to Congress’s concerns). 
45 See id. (noting the CDA was passed, in part, in the interest of children’s safety). 
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).46 
The CDA was passed into law in 1996.  Although certain portions of 
it were struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, § 230(c) remains good law.47  In the past twenty years, it 
has been applied in scores of cases to undercut not only claims for 
defamation, but other common law tort speech claims—such as invasion 
of privacy—as well as a variety of state and federal statutory claims that 
sought to impose liability on an Internet provider for speech conduct by 
Internet users that violates some state or federal law.48  The word 
“immunity” does not appear in § 230(c), but courts across the nation 
routinely say that it creates a federal immunity for Internet service 
providers and users with regard to content provided by others.49  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has never issued an opinion interpreting the meaning, 
scope, or applicability of § 230(c).50 
C. Zeran, Batzel, and Barrett 
The most widely cited opinion interpreting § 230 is Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., penned by Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shortly after the CDA 
became law.51  Zeran’s facts are remarkable.52  On April 25, 1995, an 
unknown person posted an advertisement on an America Online, Inc. 
(“AOL”) bulletin board for “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts,” indicating that 
those interested in acquiring such a T-shirt should call “Ken” at a phone 
number that was provided.53  The phone number belonged to the plaintiff, 
Kenneth Zeran, who was incontrovertibly neither the person posting the 
advertisement nor a person in any way involved in making or selling such 
                                                
46 § 230(c)(1)–(2). 
47 See 521 U.S. 844, 979 (1997) (holding that certain portions of the CDA should be 
invalidated). 
48 See generally, JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 
DECENCY ACT:  A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS 22–35 (2012) 
(surveying cases involving range of substantive causes of action for which § 230 protection 
has been sought). 
49 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm’n for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing several courts that have taken the “immunity” position). 
50 See § 230(c) (reflecting the absence of Supreme Court opinions on § 230(c)). 
51 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
52 See id. at 328–29 (highlighting the facts of the case). 
53 See id. at 329 (summarizing the details of the hoax that plagued Ken Zeran). 
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T-shirts.  The point of the anonymous poster’s hoax was evidently to cause 
Zeran to be harassed by people believing him to be horrifyingly tasteless 
and insensitive.54  The alleged T-shirt slogans were startlingly offensive:  
they made tasteless jokes about the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal 
building, which killed 168 persons (including nineteen children) less than 
one week earlier.55  In essence, the posting characterizing Zeran as trying 
to make money by selling shirts with slogans such as “Visit 
Oklahoma . . . It’s a BLAST!!!,” “Putting the kids to bed . . . Oklahoma 
1995,” and “McVeigh for President 1996.”56  Zeran received hundreds of 
angry calls per day, including death threats.57  He contacted AOL, 
demanding that the posting be taken down, but AOL refused to do so.58  
The problem was exacerbated when an Oklahoma City radio station 
learned of the posting (but did not learn that it was a hoax).59  Zeran 
brought a tort claim against AOL for the reputational harm and emotional 
distress caused by its failure to remove the defamatory postings.60  AOL 
asserted that the CDA protected it from liability, and the case went to the 
Fourth Circuit.61 
Zeran argued as follows:  even if one assumes that § 230 shields AOL 
from being treated like Prodigy was treated in Stratton Oakmont, his claim 
should still move forward because it is fundamentally different in kind 
from Stratton Oakmont’s.62  Stratton Oakmont insisted that Prodigy be 
treated like the New York Times—as a publisher, and the trial judge had 
agreed to do so.63  Section 230 forbids courts from following that lead, 
Zeran conceded, but that is irrelevant, because he wished to hold AOL 
responsible as a distributor, not as a publisher.64  Recall that Cubby 
indicated that Compuserve could not be held liable as a distributor 
                                                
54 See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 226 (2001) 
(speculating as to the goals of the hoax). 
55 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
56 See Zeran v. Diamond Broad., Inc., 203 F3d. 714, 717 (10th Cir. 2000) (naming some of 
the offensive phrases advertised in the scam). 
57 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (describing the nature of Zeran’s harassment). 
58 See id. (summarizing Zeran’s interaction with America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)). 
59 See id. (describing how Zeran’s predicament worsened after KRXO asked listeners to 
call his number, unaware of the underlying hoax). 
60 See Zeran, 203 F.3d at 335 (affirming summary judgment for the radio station on all of 
plaintiff’s claims; defamation was classified as slander per quod, requiring proof of special 
damages). 
61 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (summarizing AOL’s CDA argument). 
62 See id. at 331–34 (reiterating Zeran’s rebuttal to AOL’s argument). 
63 See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2, *4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (explaining how Prodigy commanded and controlled Epstein’s 
actions). 
64 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (summarizing Zeran’s argument against AOL). 
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because it lacked proper notice.65  Stratton Oakmont shifted categories and 
demanded that Prodigy be held liable as a publisher.  Zeran’s principal 
argument was still on the distributor side.  The CDA, Zeran argued, was 
silent as to distributor liability.66 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson rejected Zeran’s argument, insisting that 
Congress was not using the term “publisher” so narrowly in the CDA.67  
Its point was that ISP’s like AOL and Prodigy should be immune from 
lawsuits aiming to hold them liable for the defamatory comments posted 
by others.68  When it prohibits courts from treating ISP’s as “publishers” 
of information content provided by others, it is not simply saying that the 
newspaper-publisher or book-publisher doctrinal box shall not be used.69  
It is negating any doctrinal box that could be said to function under state 
(or federal) law to render ISPs liable for the harm inflicted by the 
defamatory posting of another.70  Trying to use a state law distributor-box 
to generate ISP liability is, therefore, also preempted by § 230.71  At least 
as to defamation claims, Zeran is accepted by American jurisdictions today 
without exception.72 
In some ways the most important cases in my basic story are Batzel v. 
Smith, rendered by a panel of the Ninth Circuit in 2003, and Barrett v. 
Rosenthal, decided by the California Supreme Court in 2006.73  Batzel, a 
California attorney, sued Tom Cremers, an Amsterdam-based expert in 
art museum security, for posting defamatory statements about her on a 
listserve and website.74  The statements themselves were written by Smith, 
a building contractor and handyman who had worked for Batzel in her 
house.75  Smith’s e-mail suggested that he had evidence that Batzel was a 
                                                
65 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding 
CompuServe was not a distributor). 
66 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (stating Zeran’s argument). 
67 See id. at 334 (interpreting Congress’s intended scope of the word “publisher”). 
68 See id. (explaining the purpose of the CDA); see also 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (2012) (providing 
the actual language of the act). 
69 See cf. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331–32 (continuing to interpret the § 230(c) as it pertains to 
publishers). 
70 See id. at 331–34 (barring state and local claims of defamation under the § 230(c)). 
71 See id. at 334 (reaffirming that a state claim cannot be brought under the distributor 
theory). 
72 See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(characterizing the converging position of the CDA); but see Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to 
extend immunity to a federal housing discrimination claim). 
73 See generally Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 351 F.3d 904 
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
74 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018–26 (discussing the parties and nature of the defamation 
claim). 
75 See id. at 1021 (identifying Bob Smith as the originator of the defamatory comments). 
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descendant of the Nazi Heinrich Himmler and that Batzel possessed 
valuable art that was stolen from Jews during World War II.76  Smith had 
(allegedly) sent his e-mail to art-security expert Cremers so that he could 
investigate these allegations, but Cremers (allegedly) believed that Smith 
intended him to circulate the allegations on the listserve.77 
Cremers asserted he was entitled to § 230(c) protection from Batzel’s 
defamation claim on the ground that he was merely posting information 
provided by another content provider—Smith.78  Batzel retorted that 
Cremers actually circulated and posted the defamatory e-mail letter; this 
was not a case of failure to remove another’s statement from a website, for 
Smith had not posted his statement, but merely e-mailed it to Cremers.79  
Notwithstanding a strong dissent, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel 
accepted Cremers’s argument and applied § 230(c)’s protection to 
Cremers.80  Writing for herself and one other member of the panel, Judge 
Marsha Berzon stated: 
Such a distinction between deciding to publish only some 
of the material submitted and deciding not to publish 
some of the material submitted is not a viable one.  The 
scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the 
publisher approaches the selection process as one of 
inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method 
or degree, not substance.  A distinction between 
removing an item once it has appeared on the Internet 
and screening before publication cannot fly either.81 
Although the panel technically remanded Batzel’s case for a finding on 
what Cremers would reasonably have believed Smith’s intent to have 
been, Cremers was ultimately granted summary judgment.82 
The plaintiff in Barrett was Dr. Timothy Polevoy, a Canadian 
physician and host of a website purporting to expose fraudulent claims 
about medicine and healthcare.83  The defendant was Ilena Rosenthal, 
head of a women’s healthcare foundation and operator of a website 
devoted to women’s health, and her posting was an article by publicist 
                                                
76 See id. (highlighting the specific statements made in Bob Smith’s email). 
77 See id. at 1022. 
78 See id. at 1034–35. 
79 See id. at 1035. 
80 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035.  
81 Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original). 
82 See Batzel v. Smith, 372 F. Supp. 2d 546, 547 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (entering summary 
judgment for Cremers against Batzel on procedural grounds unrelated to the merits). 
83 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (introducing the plaintiff of the 
case). 
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Tim Bolen that criticized the plaintiff Polevoy.84  The article asserted that 
Polevoy had engaged in the crime of stalking women, including the 
alleged repeated stalking of a prominent Canadian radio personality.85  
Rosenthal posted Bolen’s allegedly defamatory article on two websites 
(neither was her own).86  Before the California Supreme Court, she 
contended that § 230 shielded her from liability because she had posted 
information content that was wholly provided by another (Bolen).87  In 
response to the plaintiff’s argument that she was herself an active poster 
of a defamatory statement, not simply an ISP or website on which a 
defamatory post had been made by another, the California Supreme Court 
noted that the text of the CDA covers ISP “users” not simply ISPs.88  And 
as to the argument that posting a message is different from failing to 
remove one, the Court followed Batzel, holding that “no logical distinction 
can be drawn between a defendant who actively selects information for 
publication and one who screens submitted material, removing offensive 
content.”89  More broadly, the Court determined that “[a] user who 
actively selects and posts material based on its content fits well within the 
traditional role of ‘publisher.’”90  Reasoning that “Congress exempted that 
‘publisher’ role from liability,’” the Court concluded that Rosenthal was 
fully protected by § 230(c).91 
D. Today’s Online Libel Law 
Before examining the legacy of Batzel and Barrett in particular, it is 
worth repeating that this Article directly addresses only a slice of § 230—
that which relates to defamation law.92  Many of the most notable cases 
involve sexual assault, child prostitution, housing discrimination, and a 
variety of matters quite distant from libel law.93  Just as ambitious 
plaintiffs have sought to hold ISPs liable for defamatory statements posted 
through the ISP, so they have sought to hold websites or apps liable for 
discriminatory housing or child prostitution advertisements placed 
through the website or fraudulent solicitations for sexual activity through 
                                                
84 See id. (describing the defendant in the case). 
85 See id. at 531 (describing the crime that the plaintiff had allegedly committed). 
86 See id. at 514 (providing that Rosenthal posted the article to two websites promoting the 
politics of medicine). 
87 See id. at 527 (expanding on the argument of § 230 granting her immunity from liability). 
88 See id. at 526 (defining the term “user” under § 230(b)(3)). 
89 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 528. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 528–29. 
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (discussing how § 230 relates to defamation law). 
93 See generally, REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 48 (discussing the cases where § 230 
protection was sought). 
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the website.94  And just as ISPs and websites have inserted § 230 as a 
defense to libel claims, so they have asserted them as defenses to these 
other claims.95  Defendants asserting § 230 under such circumstances have 
succeeded in a remarkably high proportion of such cases.96 
Returning to libel law, Batzel and Barrett have been followed by the 
New York Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, and numerous district courts.97  In the past decade, not a 
single court has rejected Barrett’s holding that, in the context of a 
defamation claim, § 230 shields a defendant from liability for posting a 
defamatory statement wholly written by another person.  To this extent—
at least in several prominent and populous jurisdictions—the 
republication rule is no longer operative for defamatory statements posted 
on the Internet. 
The consequences of these rulings are remarkable.  Anyone wishing 
to hurt another person by damaging her or his reputation is free to do so 
without accountability by finding a defamatory statement that someone 
else has made and broadcasting it to the world over the Internet.98  
Conversely, a person can anonymously plant seeds of defamation with 
numerous website owners, knowing the website owners will be free to 
broadcast these defamatory statements to the world.  Those who are 
solvent and have a large Internet audience can stay free of liability by 
posting statements composed by others.  Those who are insolvent and lack 
a large Internet audience do not stand much to lose by posting defamatory 
statements, and they can reach a large audience by feeding such 
statements to Internet republishers.  Where an anonymous defamer feeds 
a libelous statement to a large website operator or member of a listserve, 
                                                
94 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, 961 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961–62 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2009) (explaining that 
the plaintiff alleged the defendant was guilty of solicitations for sexual activity through 
Craigslist.com); see also Miller v. Fed. Express Corp., 6 N.E.2d 1006, 1006–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2014) (providing the plaintiff alleged the defendant posted defamatory comments on the 
Internet about him). 
95 See, e.g., Dart, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (discussing that the defendant was immune from 
liability pursuant to § 230(c)); see also Miller, 6 N.E.2d at 1013 (expressing that the defendant 
claimed he was immune from liability based on the grounds of § 230). 
96 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding § 230 bars 
the plaintiff’s claim of defamation against the defendant); see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) 
(entering judgment for the defendant in a defamation case). 
97 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406–07 (6th Cir. 
2014) (recognizing § 230 provides immunity from liability for defendants in defamation 
cases); see also Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288–89 (N.Y. 2011) 
(stating the Court followed the Barrett national consensus). 
98 See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 467 (Del. 2005) (discussing a situation in which a 
post on a website by an anonymous user was found not to be defamatory). 
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there is simply no accountability and massive reputational harm.99  We 
are, as Judge Gould stated in his partial concurrence and partial dissent in 
Batzel, inviting an Internet “Old West.”100 
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC is representative of 
how Internet defamation law is now understood by a range of legal 
actors.101  The principal defendant in that case was Nik Richie, the owner 
and operator of the website thedirty.com.102  Members of the public are 
invited and encouraged to send him nasty and pornographic statements 
and pictures about whomever they wish to discuss.103  Richie selects 
among them and then posts some prominently on his website, typically 
adding some kind of commentary.104  The website, like many others of this 
nature, has been very popular.105  The plaintiff was a major league football 
cheerleader who sued Richie and the LLC owning his website because of 
statements that she had a venereal disease and that she had slept with 
every single member of the Cincinnati Bengals.106  The District Court 
rejected Richie’s argument that he was protected by the CDA, but the 
court did not consider relying upon an active/passive distinction to do so; 
rather, the argument was that Richie’s solicitation of materials and his 
                                                
99 See id. (concluding that the majority rules allow professional rumormongers and gossip-
hounds to spread false and hurtful information with impunity). 
100 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“Congress 
wanted to ensure that excessive government regulation did not slow America’s expansion 
into the exciting new frontier of the Internet.  But Congress did not want this new frontier to 
be like the Old West:  a lawless zone governed by retribution and mob justice.”).  In his 
dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc (in which Judges Richard Tallman and Consuela 
María Callahan concurred), Judge Ronald Gould wrote: 
I do not believe that Congress intended to make, or ever would 
consciously make, the policy choice made by the panel majority.  
Human reputations, built on good conduct over decades, should be not 
so easily tarnished and lost in a second of global Internet defamation.  
Under the panel majority’s rule, there might be a remedy against the 
initial sender, but there is no remedy against the person who willingly 
chooses, with no exercise of care, to amplify a malicious defamation by 
lodging it on the Internet for all persons and for all time.  Unless this 
result was commanded by Congress, we should not create such a 
system. 
Batzel v. Smith, 351 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
101 See Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d at 407, 417. 
102 See id. at 401 (introducing the defendant, Nik Richie, in the case). 
103 See id. (explaining how www.thedirty.com works). 
104 See id. (indicating the steps that Richie took to operate the website). 
105 See id. at 402 (expressing www.thedirty.com became nationally known). 
106 See id. at 403 (stating Sarah Jones had been spotted around town with several of the 
Cincinnati Bengals football players and that her boyfriend cheated on her with multiple 
women, resulting in her having chlamydia and gonorrhea). 
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commenting on them disqualified him from serving as a neutral 
republisher of the contributor’s defamatory posting.107 
Following the great majority of courts, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the 
question was whether Richie’s additions were themselves defamatory in 
an independent way; after answering this in the negative, the court ruled 
that Richie’s CDA defense warranted summary judgment for the 
defendant.108  A tacit premise of the Sixth Circuit’s entire analysis was that 
under the CDA, Richie could not be held liable for the simple reposting of 
his contributors’ defamatory statements.109  In other words, the rejection 
of the republication rule was simply taken for granted. Jones’s treatment 
by thedirty.com is but one example of a massive online industry that is 
profoundly misogynistic and invasive of women’s ordinary lives.110 
Notwithstanding my very dark picture of the current state of affairs, 
it is of course possible that Batzel and Barrett were rightly decided, in at 
least one important sense:  it is possible that theirs is the more faithful 
reading of the CDA.  Many commentators seem to think so, and have 
therefore called for revision of § 230.111 
My own view is that, regardless of whether § 230 was a good idea in 
the first place, Batzel and Barrett are wholly untenable as interpretations of 
it.  Indeed, my principal forward-looking claim in this Article is that future 
courts interpreting § 230 should reject the Batzel-Barrett line of cases and 
embrace the active/passive distinction in CDA interpretation.  That is the 
burden of Part IV, below.112  But first, it is worth looking in a more 
sustained manner at the problems that § 230 aimed to address—how 
defamation law should apply to the Internet. 
III.  A DOCTRINALIST’S ANALYSIS 
A. The Publication Element and the Challenge of the Internet 
In enacting § 230(c), Congress was addressing a difficult problem for 
ISPs, bulletin-board operators, and related entities and individuals.  They 
                                                
107 See Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.2d at 405 (denying Dirty World’s motion 
for summary judgment and finding Dirty World was not immune from liability under § 230, 
but clarifying that Dirty World was a neutral publisher of the defamatory post). 
108 See id. at 417 (disagreeing with the district court and granting summary judgment for 
Dirty World, finding immunity under § 230). 
109 See id. at 415–16. 
110 See generally DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (illustrating the 
impact of cyber harassment on women throughout the United States and arguing for an 
amendment to the CDA). 
111 See, e.g., Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel:  Revisiting § 230 
Immunity, 30 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1555–57 (2015) (acknowledging the pitfalls of § 230 and 
advocating revisions). 
112 See infra Part IV (analyzing the court’s view of the active/passive distinction in Batzel). 
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faced the possibility of speech-based tort liability for postings that 
somehow appeared through the ISP, but were not, in any traditional sense, 
speech by the ISP.  Commentators began discussing this possibility long 
before Cubby was decided, and had escalated the discussion after Cubby.113  
Stratton Oakmont proved it was not just hypothetical, and the fledgling 
industry went ballistic.114  The problem is that one can control whether 
one makes a defamatory or tortious statement—whether one speaks or 
writes, in the traditional sense—simply by refraining from making the 
statement.  By contrast, when someone else is doing the speaking or 
writing, one has far less control.  One may be able to remove the statement, 
or conceivably filter it, but otherwise shutting down the mechanism 
through which it appears is the most effective method.  Both the potential 
liability and the free speech impact of protecting against liability for what 
others have said through one’s Internet service are dramatically different 
from that which attaches to what one has said.  Section 230(c) was enacted 
to protect these entities by ruling out federal liability and expressly 
preempting all state law from imposing liability under such scenarios.115  
If we wish to understand the statutory solution fully, however, we will 
need to know more about both the publication element of defamation law 
generally and the Stratton Oakmont ruling in particular.116  That is what 
this section provides.117 
Legal commentators and the Stratton Oakmont court did not simply 
pull legal arguments and categories out of a hat.  Roughly a century of 
(admittedly sparse) case law from common law jurisdictions had created 
                                                
113 See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Prodigy Case May Solve Troubling Liability Puzzle, NAT’L L.J., 
B1 (1994) (commenting on legal theories discussed after Cubby); Edward V. DiLello, 
Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 199, 210–11 (1993) (discussing the possibility of speech-based tort 
liability after the Cubby decision); Philip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem:  Determining 
the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1148–
49 (1993) (addressing how the different characteristics of media affect the standards of free 
speech that are applied and discussing the Cubby decision); Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the 
Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:  Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin 
Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 87, 89 (1993) (acknowledging not all 
communication through bulletin boards is the same); Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin 
Boards and Defamation:  Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 121, 123–
24 (1987) (explaining the communication between the Internet mediums and the current libel 
law). 
114  See Clarke, supra note 39 (describing industry reaction to Stratton Oakmont). 
115 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing the purpose and meaning of § 230 in 
detail). 
116 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at 
*3, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (describing the publication element of defamation and that 
the court found Prodigy was a publisher due to the characteristics of the “Money Talk” 
computer bulletin board). 
117 See infra Part III (discussing the publication element of defamation law). 
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a number of cross-cutting distinctions and categories that illuminated the 
background for the early 1990s discussion.  Some of these were contained 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the work of treatise writers in 
torts in general.118  However, neither courts nor commentators actually 
saw through the sensitive application of doctrinal categories to the 
Internet properly during that period, and Stratton Oakmont and the 
upheaval that followed it were in part a consequence of confusion and 
hazy legal thinking.  In this context, § 230 will become much clearer, as 
will the errors of Batzel and Barrett.119 
The common law torts of libel and slander, like the tort of trespass to 
land, are intentional torts.  The intentionality of intentional torts has little 
to do with the mens rea filled intentionality of criminal law.  The law does 
not require that the defendant have undertaken to bring about an injury 
of a certain kind, but that the defendant have voluntarily and intentionally 
performed a certain affirmative act.  In the case of the defamation torts, it 
is the uttering, inscribing, displaying, announcing, or posting of certain 
defamatory statements about someone to a third party. 
It is crucial to recognize that the common law of libel has never 
equated the requirement of an affirmative act of publication to a third 
party with the authorship of an assertion.  This is true in both directions—
authorship is neither necessary nor sufficient for publication.120  An author 
of a defamatory statement who places it in a letter to the plaintiff herself 
has not published the libel, because she has not published it to a third 
party.121  Conversely, a newspaper that publishes a column or an 
advertisement written by another is a prototype of a publisher, regardless 
of whether the author of the column or the advertisement is an agent of 
the newspaper.122  Indeed, America’s most famous libel case—New York 
Times v. Sullivan—concerns a paid advertisement published by the New 
York Times.123  Notwithstanding nine Supreme Court Justices who 
                                                
118 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 797–802 (5th ed. 
1984) (explaining the doctrinal categories of liability in defamation law). 
119 See § 230 (describing the elements of the protection for private blocking and screening 
of offensive material); see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 510–11 (Cal. 2006) (holding 
that the messages posted to a newsgroup on the Internet were defamatory); see also Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling the operator was not able to take 
advantage of § 230 immunity from liability). 
120 See, e.g., Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 312 (1922) (noting that in libel, unlike 
slander, an act of inscription and an act of publication to a third party may be separate). 
121 See, e.g., Yousling v. Dare, 98 N.W. 371, 371 (Iowa 1904) (holding that there is no libel 
claim where a written statement was sent only to the person defamed, not to a third person). 
122 See id. (discussing that a person who has sent a defamatory statement to another is 
considered a publisher and is guilty of defamation). 
123 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 255 (1964) (explaining the respondent’s 
claim that a full page ad had been run in the New York Times, resulting in him being libeled). 
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searched high and low for good arguments to shield the newspaper, not 
one of the Justices questioned whether the New York Times counted as a 
publisher of the advertisement, which was not written by an agent of the 
New York Times.124 
The basic point is this:  an author’s composition and utterance or 
inscription of a statement is one thing; the act of presenting that statement 
to a third party is another.  Often the author performs both acts; indeed, 
in slander, a single utterance to a third party is typically both.  But in most 
of what is litigated in the law of libel, the initial inscription and the 
presentation to the world are separate acts.125  Libel suits against what, in 
non-legalese, are called “publishers”—newspapers, book publishers, and 
magazine publishers—are of course very common, even though these 
have typically performed the second kind of affirmative act—presenting 
something composed by another to the world—but not the first 
(composing the statement).126 
Unsurprisingly, over the centuries there has been some amount of 
interpretation and innovation in the history of defamation law 
surrounding some aspects of the rule requiring such an affirmative act of 
publication.  The challenges, which are remarkably few and far-between 
in American case law, mainly come from two different sides.  One side 
involves crafting inclusive notions of agency and joint liability.  Assuming 
that a newspaper that printed a defamatory letter to the editor performed 
the affirmative act of libeling, what about the company that made the 
printing press or the newsvendor that sold the newspaper?  What about 
the telecommunications company that allowed one person to defame 
another over the telephone?  What about the bookstore or the newsvendor 
that makes the publications available to buyers by selling them?  These are 
all questions about whether the making of the statement was in some 
sense an act of those who play a causal role in having the statement made 
public to third parties. 
A different, and in some ways more profound, challenge to the 
affirmative act requirement does not aim to depict the defendant as part 
of the initial making or publishing of a statement, but aims to hold the 
defendant responsible for failing to remove a statement that someone else 
                                                
124 See id. (providing the complete analysis taken by the court to reach a decision). 
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (listing a statement 
and publication as separate elements of defamation). 
126 See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace:  The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 588 (2001) (listing what are 
considered primary publishers and explaining that they are not the original authors). 
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published.127  This is quite a narrow exception to the rule that there must 
be an affirmative act of publishing a statement; before the Internet, most 
American lawyers had likely never even heard of a single libel case of this 
nature.   As in nonfeasance doctrine within the law of negligence, it applies 
when a defendant is situated relative to the defamatory statement in such 
a way that there are special reasons for thinking there is a duty to remove 
it.  Typically, the reason rests in significant part on the fact that the 
defamatory statement appears on, in, or at a physical space over which the 
defendant has possession and control, meaning that others do not have a 
right or power to remove it.128  Overwhelmingly, courts require that the 
defendant space-owner knew that the defamatory statement was there.129  
Even with these two conditions satisfied, it is not clear that liability should 
or will lie.130 
I shall call these two different forms of liability expanded-agency-based 
misfeasance and affirmative duty to remove.  Although American case law 
contains only traces of these ideas, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (like 
the Restatement (First)) actually contains a provision for each. Section 581 
is written in a manner that appears limited, but in fact it contains quite a 
broad reach, allowing for notice to trigger liability.131 
§ 581 Transmission of Defamation Published by Third 
Person 
(1) Except as stated in subsection (2), one who only 
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a 
third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows 
or has reason to know of its defamatory character. 
(2) One who broadcasts defamatory matter by means of 
radio or television is subject to the same liability as an 
original publisher.132 
                                                
127 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (stating 
there is a duty to remove defamation when the owner of the property has knowledge of the 
defamation). 
128 See Annemarie Pantazis, Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.: Insulating Internet Service Providers 
from Defamation Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 547–48 (1999) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) and explaining the court used § 577 to 
support its notion). 
129 See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (1952) (emphasizing the defendant’s awareness 
of the existence of defamatory matter). 
130 See Scott v. Hull, 259 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1970) (holding the defendant was not liable for 
failing to remove defamatory graffiti because he did not invite the public to view it and did 
not perform a positive act). 
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (permitting liability for 
a distributor who has notice). 
132 Id. 
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Section 581(1) is typically cited as the source for distributor liability in the 
Restatement (Second).133 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 577(2), by contrast, concerns 
liability for those who—while not actually publishing—will be subjected 
to liability for the reputational injury that is attributable to the defendant’s 
failure to remove a defamatory statement published by another person.134  
It states “[o]ne who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove 
defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his 
possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued 
publication.”135 
Initially, it is worth noting that neither of these routes captures a 
distinctive form of transmission that arguably fits an ISP the best—the 
common carrier.  The rather sparse case law on common carriers quite 
defensibly takes the view that common carriers are not publishers and are 
not liable as if they were publishers.136  And indeed, the New York Court of 
Appeals, in a case that came to it after Stratton Oakmont had been decided 
but before the CDA was in effect, plausibly ruled as a matter of common 
law that there was no liability for AOL because it was a common carrier.137 
Secondly, both the expanded-agency category and the affirmative-
duty-to-remove category are remarkably underdeveloped and 
questionable in American law; the Restatement (Second) is highly 
misleading, in this respect, as today’s leading Torts treatise, Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick’s The Law of Torts now confirms.138  The case law cited 
in the Restatement (Second) provision concerning distributors is 
overwhelmingly prior to the Restatement (First).139  Given that the New 
                                                
133 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 581 for distributor liability). 
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating a third 
party can be liable for defamation if the defamatory statement is not removed). 
135 Id. 
136 See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that the 
telephone company was not liable for defamation because it was a common carrier). 
137 See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Corp., 723 N.E.2d 539, 543 (N.Y. 1999) (applying the 
common carrier category to the Internet and holding the publication element of libel was not 
satisfied).  
138 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 522 n.5 (2nd ed. 2011) (answering the 
question of whether a neutral distributor, such as a library, is liable even if the distributor 
knows of the defamation by suggesting that the English cases, which is the precedent for 
such liability, are “doubtful authority for American consumption” in light of 
“[c]ontemporary American ideas about liability for speech”). 
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (discussing the 
outdated cases in the Restatement). Of the twelve cases cited in the Reporters’ Notes on 
distributors, the majority were over one hundred years old.  Reporters’ Notes to § 581, 
comments a-c.  Only six were American, and of these six, only two were decided after New 
York Times v. Sullivan.  Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla.App.), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 674 
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York Times v. Sullivan revolution occurred between the two Restatements, 
it is likely that such section 581-based libel suits against libraries would 
not survive a First Amendment attack, for the chilling effect argument 
would seem to be very powerful as applied to defamation law that 
requires distributors to engage in censorship.140  It is more than a bit 
peculiar that scores of judges and law review authors since Cubby have 
contrasted publisher liability with distributor liability, given that Zeran’s 
statements about distributor liability were almost entirely adventitious 
and without support in the applicable American law.141 
The few section 577(2) cases that exist are questionable and peculiar.  
Hellar v. Bianco is the best known case.  In 1952, an intermediate California 
court announced that it might be willing to hold a tavern owner liable to 
a plaintiff and her husband because its bartender did not immediately 
                                                
(Fla. 1977); Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. Med. Ass’n Fed’n, 264 N.W.2d 152 
(Minn. 1978).  Cardozo v. True is not a defamation case at all, but rather a personal injury 
products liability case against a book dealer, which failed as a matter of law.  Cardozo, 342 
So. 2d at 1056.  It provides no support whatsoever for the statement that book dealers are 
liable with knowledge in a libel claim; in dicta it states that they are surely not libel without 
knowledge, which is a different point.  Id.  Church of Scientology is a libel claim; it holds only 
that lack of knowledge precludes a libel claim against a distributor, not that knowledge 
inculpates a distributor.  Church of Scientology of Minn., 246 N.W.2d at 154–55 
 Among the scholars asserting that it was established law in the United States, prior to 
§ 230, that distributors face liability for libel if they have knowledge, few rely upon anything 
but Restatement (Second) § 581, criticized above.  In a forceful and unusually well-researched 
article written in 2001, Professor Susan Freiwald did cite two post-New York Times v. Sullivan 
cases to support distributor liability under section 581.  Freiwald, supra note 126, at 590 n.81; 
see also Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (D. Wyo. 1986); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 
745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).  In the end, however, these cases only underline the 
remarkable dearth of support for knowledge-based distributor liability today.  Lerman is not 
a libel case, but a misappropriation case, and, in any event, the distributor prevailed.   Spence 
is a libel case in a federal district court that is interpreting Wyoming tort law on a motion to 
remand.  The question there was whether the defendant non-resident magazine publisher 
seeking to remove a libel case from state court to federal court should succeed on a motion 
to remand.  Flynt’s argument was that the Wyoming distributor was fraudulently joined in 
state court to defeat removal.  The District Court said Hustler could succeed only through 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that there was no way the plaintiff could 
possibly win against the distributor of the pornographic magazine.  With no apparent 
consideration of the First Amendment and no relevant precedent (other than section 581), 
the District Court declined to classify the cause of action against the distributor as fraudulent 
and remanded the case.  Id.  
140 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (outlining that “chilling effect” of strict 
liability or fault standard warrants “actual malice” rule); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating third-party liability for transmission of 
defamation). 
141 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(discussing the difference between publisher and distributor liability); see also Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating notice of a defamatory posting causes 
computer service providers to become traditional publishers). 
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erase some nasty graffiti about her from the men’s room bathroom stall.142  
Regardless of whether one agrees with Judge Frank Easterbrook’s wry 
comment in Tacket v. General Motors Corp. (also imposing liability for 
failure to remove) that “the common law of washrooms is otherwise,” the 
law of libel by failure-to-remove is extremely underdeveloped.143  Indeed, 
even in the United Kingdom, where Internet service providers have 
indeed faced failure-to-remove liability, plaintiffs had to rely entirely 
upon Byrne v. Deane, an almost cartoonish Court of Appeal case in which 
the permissibility of failure-to-remove liability is pure dicta.144 
Notwithstanding the concerns raised above (or perhaps oblivious to 
them), thoughtful commentators (often law students writing Notes) in the 
early 1990s saw the possibility of holding ISPs liable for the postings of 
others under three-plus views.  They are:  (1) a full-fledged newspaper-
                                                
142 See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 758 (Cal. 1952) (providing the facts of the case and 
imposing liability for not removing defamation). 
143 See 836 F.2d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 1987). 
144 See Tamiz v. Google, Inc., EWCA Civ. 68, 1 W.L.R. 2151 (2013) (rejecting liability based 
on the facts of the case, but recognizing, in principle, the possibility of liability for failure to 
remove, after notice, but not within publisher or distributor framework).  Many of the 
common law categories and analyses (of libel on the Internet) that are discussed in this 
Article have been dealt with explicitly in other common law jurisdictions, which lack or did 
lack any statutory shield for ISPs.  See generally Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful 
Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289 (2014) (describing treatment of ISPs 
and website hosts in non-American common law jurisdictions); see also Byrne v. Deane, 1 
K.B. 818 (1937).  Members of a private club at a golf course in rural England enjoyed the 
illegal gaming machines kept in their clubhouse.  Byrne, 1 K.B. at 818.  They were therefore 
distressed when the clubhouse was raided by public authorities and the tables were 
removed.  Id.  At the spot in the clubhouse room where the gaming tables had been, a verse 
was posted on the wall: 
For many years upon this spot  
You heard the sound of a merry bell 
Those who were rash and those who were not 
Lost and made a spot of cash 
But he who gave the game away 
May he byrnn in hell and rue the day. 
“Diddleramus” 
Id.  The word “byrnn” in the last line was crossed out, and the word “burn” was scrawled 
over it.  Id.  A member of the club, Mr. Byrne, brought a libel claim against the proprietors of 
the clubhouse, arguing that this verse essentially communicated that it was Mr. Byrne who 
had secretly reported to the police on the existence of illegal gambling.  Id.  Byrne denied this 
and claimed that his reputation had suffered.  Id.  The clubhouse owners argued that a libel 
claim includes a publication element, which they did not satisfy since they neither wrote nor 
posted the anonymous verse.  Byrne, 1 K.B. at 818.  While the trial court accepted this 
argument, each of the three judges on the Court of Appeal panel that heard the case opined 
that the publication element could be met in this case.  Id.  Under the circumstances, the 
knowing failure to remove the verse from their own property could count as publication.  Id.  
The decision as to the publication element was only dicta, because the Court of Appeal also 
ruled that it was not defamatory to say of someone that he reported a crime to the police.  Id. 
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publisher theory; (2) an expanded agency theory, treating ISPs as 
distributors and imposing liability under section 581; and (3-plus) an 
affirmative-duty-to-remove route, as in section 577(2) (which may depend 
on ownership or property or chattels, as in section 577(2) itself, or on an 
undertaking-to-protect theory).  In each case, there was allegedly a 
doctrinal path under state defamation law for saying that the publication 
element of a libel clam was satisfied, and, in this sense, there was a 
doctrinal path for treating an ISP as a publisher of a statement that the ISP 
itself did not post. 
 B. Stratton Oakmont Revisited 
Stratton Oakmont’s lawyers drew upon this fledgling Internet-
liability scholarship in crafting their complaint and in writing their briefs 
to Justice Ain.145  Recall, however, that Judge Leisure had selected the 
distributor category only two years earlier in Cubby, and, on that basis, 
had granted the defendant summary judgment.146  Understandably, then, 
Stratton Oakmont was driven to argue that theirs was not a distributor 
case; indeed, of the three routes above—publisher, expanded-agency 
based distributor liability, and affirmative-duty-to-remove—the middle 
category is the only one Stratton Oakmont did not argue.147  Its complaint 
and its brief were committed to the first and third categories. 
A bit more detail about Prodigy’s history will be illuminating.  From 
its inception, Prodigy played to the family-values mantra that had taken a 
major foothold in the Reagan 1980s and the first Bush Presidency.  The 
company boasted of its commitment to filtering and censoring materials 
with a “family-oriented” mindset.148  It hired individuals to monitor its 
                                                
145 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
at 11 n.3, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) 
(citing Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation:  Who Should Be Liable? Under 
What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 121, 122 (1987)); id. at 12 n.4 (citing Philip H. Miller, New 
Technology, Old Problem:  Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information 
Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (1993)); id. at 13 n.5 (citing Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the 
Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:  Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin 
Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 87, 89 (1993)); id. at 13 n.6 (citing Edward V. 
DiLello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin 
Boards, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 199, 210–11 (1993)). 
146 See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 141. 
147 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (arguing Prodigy is not a distributor).  
148 See Defendant Prodigy Services Company’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9-18, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) (on 
file with the Valparaiso Law Review) (recounting history of Prodigy and changes in Prodigy 
filtering). 
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bulletin boards and remove obscene or otherwise offensive materials.  In 
the early 1990s, it made an effort to review—or to have its hired monitors 
review—everything that users posted.  It also used software with 
algorithms for discovering obscene or offensive materials and filtering 
them out.  This was a marketing ploy and a company goal.  During this 
period, Prodigy’s marketing director went so far as to analogize Prodigy 
explicitly to a “newspaper” publisher.149 
Within a few years of functioning in this manner, however, the growth 
of the Internet and the growth of Prodigy itself made clear that its 
aspirations for total monitoring were wildly unrealistic.  For one thing, 
algorithms were not up to the task of discovering obscene, pornographic, 
or inappropriate materials.  And for another, the rate and number of 
postings, starting to be in the tens of thousands daily, were far beyond 
what could be checked thoroughly—either in advance, or even in an 
ongoing way.  Nonetheless, Prodigy’s marketing materials, strategy, and 
structure from its earlier years remained public, and it had not yet fully 
recognized how it would have to change. 
Stratton Oakmont’s litigation strategy, as displayed in its complaint 
and its briefs, prudently took advantage of Prodigy’s marketed self-image.  
The most obvious line of argument, and the one Stratton Oakmont placed 
front and center, was simply that Prodigy was virtually the same as a 
newspaper publisher.  After all, Prodigy had said this expressly about 
itself: 
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that 
reflects the culture of the millions of American families 
we aspire to serve.  Certainly no responsible newspaper 
does less when it chooses the type of advertising it 
publishes, the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and 
unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.150 
Prodigy’s admission is undoubtedly part of what gave Justice Ain 
comfort in his unusual grant of partial summary judgment to the 
plaintiff.151  The lawyers for Prodigy pointed out that the admission was 
                                                
149 See id. 
150 See id. at *2 (quoting Exhibit J to Plaintiffs’ Affidavit). 
151 The court was remarkably unclear on why it was granting plaintiff partial summary 
judgment on publication, rather than treating publication as a fact issue and giving the 
publication issue to the jury to decide—which would itself have been a remarkably pro-
plaintiff decision.  Id. at *1.  The court stated the following: 
Again, [Prodigy] insists that its former policy of manually reviewing all 
messages prior to posting was changed “long before the messages 
complained of by Plaintiffs were posted.”  (Schneck affidavit, par. 4.)  
However, no documentation or detailed explanation of such a change, 
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stale and that the Internet business was changing dramatically in the early 
1990s.  However, Stratton Oakmont had anticipated such arguments and 
was prepared with several additional points, which relied upon the 
budding legal scholarship on libel law and how it would apply to the 
Internet.  One of its key arguments—again based on Prodigy admissions, 
but current ones—was that Prodigy actively engaged in censorship and 
filtering of online communications of others.152  In this way, Prodigy 
exercised control of what appeared through it, and, in this respect, was 
much more like a traditional newspaper publisher than Compuserve.  
Indeed, Prodigy tried to gain market advantage over competitors like 
Compuserve by engaging in such editorial functions.  Stratton Oakmont 
rightly argued that Prodigy’s exercise of editorial functions was a factor 
that counted in favor of treating it like a newspaper publisher.  All of this 
was channeled into an argument that Justice Ain should grant partial 
summary judgment on the issue of whether Prodigy was a publisher.153 
Crucially, however, Stratton Oakmont had a quite different argument, 
too; indeed, Stratton Oakmont’s partial summary judgment motion was 
divided into two parts, and its second argument occupied the second part 
of its brief.154  Stratton Oakmont pointed out that Prodigy had hired an 
individual, Charles Epstein, to serve as what it called a “Board Leader” 
for its bulletin board, “Money Talk.”  As Board Leader, Epstein’s job was 
                                                
and the dissemination of news of such a change, has been submitted.  In 
addition, [Prodigy] argues that in terms of sheer volume-currently 
60,000 messages a day are posted on [Prodigy] bulletin boards-manual 
review of messages is not feasible.  While [Prodigy] admits that Board 
Leaders may remove messages that violate its Guidelines, it claims in 
conclusory manner that Board Leaders do not function as “editors”.  
Furthermore, [Prodigy] argues generally that this Court should not 
decide issues that can directly impact this developing communications 
medium without the benefit of a full record, although it fails to describe 
what further facts remain to be developed on this issue of whether it is a 
publisher. 
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  The italicized sentence is hard to comprehend, given that the 
court had just described the need for documentation and more information on “feasibility.”  
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3.  Relatedly, it is bizarre that the court stated that 
“the critical issue to be determined by this Court is whether the foregoing evidence 
establishes a prima facie case that [Prodigy] exercised sufficient editorial control over its 
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a 
newspaper.”  Id. (emphasis added).  A prima facie case is what a plaintiff needs to withstand 
a defendant’s summary judgment motion, not what a plaintiff needs to prevail on (partial) 
summary judgment.  Id. 
152 See id. at *2. 
153 See id. at *1. 
154 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
14–19, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) (arguing that Epstein served as Prodigy’s agent 
by editing “Money Talk”). 
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to monitor the electronic bulletin board on which the defamatory 
statements were posted and to remove some when appropriate.155  
Stratton Oakmont alleged that Epstein had failed to remove these 
postings, even though such postings violated policies of not publishing 
offensive material.156  Prodigy responded that Epstein was an 
independent contractor, rather than an employee; therefore, Prodigy 
could not be held vicariously liable for Epstein’s failures.157  To this, 
Stratton Oakmont argued that, independent contractor or not, basic 
principles of agency law required that Stratton Oakmont be deemed 
potentially liable for Epstein’s failures in monitoring the Prodigy bulletin 
board and that partial summary judgment was also warranted on this 
agency issue.158 
As mentioned above, when we step back from Stratton Oakmont and 
see it within the framework of libel law’s doctrinal categories—true 
publisher, extended agency (distributor, etc.), and affirmative duty to 
remove—it is clear that the plaintiff was interested in two parts:  the true 
publisher part (involving Stratton Oakmont’s admissions) and the 
affirmative-duty-to-remove part (involving Epstein’s alleged failures).159  
The distributor theory was left out—not only because there was nothing 
about Prodigy that made it seem like a distributor in this context, but also, 
and more importantly, because the distributor argument had worked on 
summary judgment for Compuserve and Stratton Oakmont’s aim was to 
distinguish Prodigy from Compuserve.160 
Justice Ain’s grant of plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion 
actually addressed both of Stratton Oakmont’s arguments.161  And it 
awarded partially summary judgment on both:  on the true publisher 
argument and on the affirmative-duty-to-remove part (pertaining to the 
agency relationship).162  “Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that 
Epstein acted as [Prodigy’s] agent for the purposes of the acts and 
omissions alleged in the complaint.”163 
                                                
155 See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) 
(alleging Prodigy breached duty of care). 
156 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1.  
157 See id. at *5. 
158 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 14,  Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, 
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) (asserting Epstein was Prodigy’s agent). 
159 See id. at 2. 
160 See id. at 9–10 (contrasting the facts in this case from those in CompuServe). 
161 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (stating Epstein’s capacity as a 
publisher and the duty to censor). 
162 See id.  
163 Id. at *7. 
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To be sure, the relevance of Justice Ain’s “agency” ruling was not 
rendered pellucid in the decision itself.164  One can read the opinion and 
believe there is simply one legal theory in the case—that Prodigy’s role is 
that of a newspaper publisher.165  Note, however, that if that were true, 
whether Epstein was an agent would be irrelevant to Prodigy’s liability.166  
Since the posting was plainly on a Prodigy bulletin board and there was 
no allegation that Epstein put it there, a finding that Prodigy was the 
publisher of what was posted in its bulletin board would suffice for 
publisher-liability.  It would be irrelevant whether Epstein was at fault for 
failure to remove it. Part of the point of treating an entity as a true 
publisher is that there is essentially strict liability for the publishing of it.  
In that event, Epstein’s acts and omissions would be irrelevant.  Epstein’s 
conduct was relevant to Stratton Oakmont’s claim because Stratton 
Oakmont contended that Board Leaders, like Epstein, had a duty to 
remove defamatory statements, and Epstein breached that duty by 
negligently omitting to remove the statement.167 
The second issue of Stratton Oakmont related not to the 
newspaper/distributor connection as such, but rather to the question of 
whether liability could be imposed for the negligent failure to comply 
with a duty to remove defamatory statements.  This was a sensible and 
difficult debate presented by the facts of Stratton Oakmont, but it was not 
really about whether Prodigy was like a newspaper publisher in the sense 
of actively placing statements by others out into the world for third 
parties.  However, this does not necessarily end the important debate; it 
leads to another one:  whether Prodigy could be held responsible for the 
reputational harm suffered by virtue of its (or its agents) having breached 
an affirmative duty to filter or delete others’ postings.  For one thing, its 
bulletin boards were closely analogous to the bulletin boards, chattels, or 
property that are referred to in section 577(2).168  And for another, it 
arguably undertook to screen and delete. 
Once this affirmative duty framework is seen, Prodigy’s repeated 
assertions that it was capable of filtering, selecting, editing, and deleting 
                                                
164 See id.  
165 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Stratton Oakmont court reasoned that Prodigy’s decision to 
perform some voluntary self-policing made it akin to a newspaper publisher . . . .”). 
166 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *6 (discussing Epstein’s agency 
relationship). 
167 See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).  
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who 
intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be 
exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for 
its continued publication.”). 
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take on a whole different light.169  Prodigy had undertaken to remove, then 
failed to live up to its undertaking.170  Moreover, it had created in readers 
an expectation of removal, and therefore, added to the perception of 
endorsement.171  Finally, it had undercut the credibility of protestations of 
lack of control.172  In this context, the argument for an affirmative duty to 
remove was powerful.173  Relatedly, the argument that the injury was 
suffered due to the failure to remove or filter out was also quite strong.174 
This was one of Stratton Oakmont’s principal arguments.175  While 
Stratton Oakmont’s first argument was that Prodigy was simply like a 
newspaper publisher, the larger picture put forward by Stratton Oakmont 
was that Prodigy had an affirmative duty to remove defamatory postings 
because of its undertaking.176  Indeed, Stratton Oakmont’s reply brief uses 
language emphasizing the undertaking basis of the affirmative duty:  
“having undertaken a duty to edit, Prodigy cannot now complain that its 
[sic] too difficult for it to do so properly,” “[t]he law is settled in New York 
that one who assumes a duty to act, even though gratuitously, may 
thereby become subject to the ‘duty of acting carefully.’”177  And these 
undertaking-based arguments by Stratton Oakmont were, ultimately, key 
to the basis of Justice Ain’s ruling:  “[Prodigy’s] conscious choice, to gain 
the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than 
CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such choice.”178 
                                                
169 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (contending Prodigy knew about the 
Board Leaders’ ability to remove messages in violation of the guidelines). 
170 See id. at *5 (stating Prodigy had in fact benefitted by undertaking editorial control). 
171 See id. at *5 (arguing that undertaking editorial duties gave Prodigy a family-friendly 
image). 
172 See id. at *4 (distinguishing the case from Compuserve in part because Prodigy had 
control over the content of its bulletin boards). 
173 See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 14–15, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (alleging 
Prodigy intentionally marketed the fact that the bulletin boards were controlled by editors, 
leading to the breached duty of care). 
174 See id. at 16 (contending Prodigy knowingly refused to take the libelous content off the 
bulletin board). 
175 See id. at 14–15 (arguing Prodigy undertook a duty by having editors filter content). 
176 See id. at 15–16 (basing more argumentation on the duty to remove). 
177 Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 2, Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 
WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1994); id. at 12 (citing Florence v. Goldberg, 375 
N.E.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. 1978) and quoting Florence’s quotation of Chief Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo’s statement, in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928) 
that “the hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though 
liability would fail if it had never been applied at all”). 
178 Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710 at *5. 
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C. CDA § 230 and the Good Samaritan 
On this interpretation of Stratton Oakmont, Congress’s effort to 
overrule the case with something called a “Good Samaritan” statute 
makes perfect sense.  More precisely, § 230(c) becomes clear when 
interpreted as a statute aimed at preempting “failure-to-remove” based 
arguments for ISP liability that were founded in an undertaking to censor 
and delete.179 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material . . .  
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable . . . .180 
This section basically reverses Justice Ain’s statement that an ISP’s choice 
to restrict, filter, remove, delete, and edit creates an affirmative duty to do 
so and liability concomitant on that affirmative duty; it states that an ISP’s 
choice to filter or delete material posted by others shall not be a basis for 
holding an ISP civilly liable for negligent failing to do so.181  But this of 
course forces us to ask the question:  why would it be a basis for holding 
them liable, and this quite naturally leads us to ask why was it a basis for 
holding Prodigy liable? 
The answer is now clear:  in the context of an effort to hold a defendant 
liable for failure to filter out or remove a defamatory statement from a 
place over which the defendant has special control, a practice of restriction 
and censorship can be a basis for holding them liable for failure to filter or 
remove.182  Section 230(c) proclaims that courts may not make this 
                                                
179 See H.R. REP. NO. 104–458, at 208 (1996) (“One of the specific purposes of this section is 
to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated [] 
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they 
have restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
180 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
181 See § 230(c)(2)(A) (negating potential publisher liability for Internet providers). 
182 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“under [Stratton 
Oakmont’s] holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of 
offensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to liability, because such 
regulation cast the service provider in the role of the publisher”). 
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inference from a practice-of-removal-and-restriction to liability for failure 
to filter or remove.183 
We are, of course, familiar with exactly the same pattern of argument 
in the law of negligence.184  At the common law, strangers do not, in the 
first instance, have duties to help those in need.185  If, however, a stranger 
has undertaken to help someone, she may be held be liable for the injuries 
resulting from her failure to help effectively.186  State legislatures across 
the country have been alert to a pathological set of incentives in this 
common law structure:  a person may be disincentivized from being a 
Good Samaritan because such volunteering is treated by the common law 
as a basis for inferring a duty of care where none existed before.187  In 
response, every American state legislature has passed a Good Samaritan 
statute to eliminate the common law disincentive:  these statutes provide 
a shield to defendants who do make efforts to rescue by ensuring that such 
efforts will not be utilized as a basis for overturning the basic rule that 
there is no affirmative duty to help.188 
On my account, it is no coincidence that the § 230(c) is actually 
expressly named “Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening 
of offensive materials.”189  It is, in fact, a parallel to state Good Samaritan 
statutes that protect those who voluntarily provide emergency aid.190  Its 
aim is to shield (from tort liability) those who voluntarily protect 
individuals from Internet speech that would harm them; removing such 
speech or filtering will not generate civil liability; courts will not be 
allowed to convert an ISP’s affirmative undertaking into a basis for 
liability. 
The legislative history unambiguously confirms the importance of the 
Good Samaritan idea that is explicit in the text.191  Representative Chris 
                                                
183 See § 230(c)(2) (granting immunity for online publishers who voluntarily make a good 
faith effort to patrol user posts). 
184 See Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 842-43 (Okla. 1993) (describing 
duty-of-care-based counterincentives to voluntary aid at common law as a basis for Good 
Samaritan statute). 
185 See id. 
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (illustrating that 
undertaking to rescue, and doing so negligently, can trigger liability to a third party). 
187 See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (West 2013) (shielding good faith 
rescuers from tort liability). 
188 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 312 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that every 
American state has a Good Samaritan statute). 
189 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012) (titling the section, “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material”). 
190 Compare id. (providing immunity for publishers who undertake to patrol the content on 
their websites), with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (providing immunity for 
traditional rescuers in emergency situations). 
191 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996). 
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Cox of California, who (along with Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon) 
spearheaded § 230, testified to Congress as follows: 
. . . Ironically, the existing legal system provides a 
massive disincentive for the people who might best help 
us control the Internet to do so.   
I will give you two quick examples:  A Federal court 
in New York, in a case involving CompuServe, one of our 
on-line service providers, held that CompuServe would 
not be liable in a defamation case because it was not the 
publisher or editor of the material.  It just let everything 
come onto your computer without, in any way, trying to 
screen it or control it.   
But another New York court, the New York Supreme 
Court, held that Prodigy, CompuServe’s competitor, 
could be held liable in a $200 million defamation case 
because someone had posted on one of their bulletin 
boards, a financial bulletin board, some remarks that 
apparently were untrue about an investment bank, that 
the investment bank would go out of business and was 
run by crooks. 
Prodigy said, “No, no; just like CompuServe, we did 
not control or edit that information, nor could we, 
frankly.  We have over 60,000 of these messages each day, 
we have over 2 million subscribers, and so you cannot 
proceed with this kind of a case against us.” 
The court said, “No, no, no, no, you are different; you 
are different than CompuServe because you are a family-
friendly network.  You advertise yourself as such.  You 
employ screening and blocking software that keeps 
obscenity off of your network.  You have people who are 
hired to exercise an emergency delete function to keep 
that kind of material away from your subscribers.  You 
don’t permit nudity on your system.  You have content 
guidelines.  You, therefore, are going to face higher, 
stricker (sic) liability because you tried to exercise some 
control over offensive material.” 
Mr. Chairman, that is backward.  We want to 
encourage people like Prodigy, like CompuServe, like 
America Online, like the new Microsoft network, to do 
everything possible for us, the customer, to help us 
control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door 
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of our house, what comes in and what our children 
see. . . . 
. . . [O]ur amendment will . . . protect computer Good 
Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who 
provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes 
steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their 
customers.  It will protect them from taking on liability 
such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York that 
they should not face for helping us and for helping us 
solve this problem.192 
As indicated, the express language of “Good Samaritan” endured all the 
way into the text of the statute.193  Section 230 plainly constitutes an 
Internet version of the traditional Good Samaritan statute.194  To 
incentivize voluntarily protecting those who are at peril of injury, it 
negates the common law principle that voluntarily protecting others 
creates an affirmative duty where none existed before. 
Attending to the affirmative-duty, or Good Samaritan, part of Stratton 
Oakmont illuminates two other important features of the text of § 230(c).195  
First, consider § 230(c)(2)(b)’s reference to “enabling”: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of . . .  
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (1).196 
Plainly, the statute is no longer contemplating a defendant in a libel suit 
who is acting like a newspaper publisher; it is contemplating an actor (ISP 
or IS user) who has undertaken to provide others with means to restrict 
obscene materials.197  Why would a jurisdiction ever impose liability for 
such enabling conduct?  It has nothing to do with supplying the medium 
of publication or contributing to the action of publication; to the contrary, 
                                                
192 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01 (1995). 
193 See § 230(c)(2)(A). 
194 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (comparing Texas’s Good Samaritan statute 
with § 230(c)). 
195 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (assessing Stratton Oakmont’s liability as a publisher). 
196 § 230(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
197 See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[S]ection 
230(c)(2)(B) . . . covers actions taken to enable or make available to others the technical means 
to restrict access to objectionable material.”). 
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it is about undertaking to restrict material.  The answer is that the statutory 
framework contemplates affirmative duties to restrict successfully that are 
acquired by virtue of having undertaken to restrict or to enable others to 
restrict.198 
Second, Stratton Oakmont’s discussion of the “Board Leader” and the 
putative consequences of his negligent failure to remove is critical in 
illuminating the place of the word “user” in § 230.199 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable . . .200 
The idea is that not only the ISP directly (Prodigy) but also the individual 
person engaged in deleting or restricting (Board Leader Epstein) cannot 
be held liable for the defamatory content of what makes it through, simply 
by virtue of having engaged in the undertaking.  We are well outside of 
the domain of contemplating liability for extended agency, for newspaper 
publisher or distributor; what is contemplated is liability for failure to 
remove, predicated upon something akin to a commenced rescue.  That is 
why the actor protected by the statute need not be an ISP, but could be 
simply a user. 
D. Zeran Revisited 
It is illuminating to revisit Zeran with this background understanding 
in place.201  Zeran was a tricky case and not simply because of its powerful 
facts or because the plaintiff chose to make a “distributor” argument, 
rather than a section 577(2), failure-to-remove argument.202  It was a tricky 
case because it fell into what might be have been perceived as a textual 
gap in § 230.  The doctrinal, historical, and statutory analysis above 
                                                
198 See § 230(c)(2)(B) (“[A]ny action taken to enable or make available . . . .”). 
199 See James P. Jenal, When is a User not a “User”?  Finding the Proper Role for Republication 
Liability on the Internet, 24 LOY. OF L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453–54 (2004) (identifying who counts as 
a “user” as an important CDA issue and arguing that the CDA’s shield should not apply to 
Rosenthal (in Barrett v. Rosenthal) because being a non-moderating poster should not count 
as a “user”). 
200 § 230(c)(2)(A). 
201 See supra Part III.A–C (discussing the differing approaches to how a plaintiff might try 
to satisfy the publication element of a libel claim). 
202 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329–32 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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indicated that—in retrospect—there were really three promising ways for 
Stratton Oakmont to have argued that Prodigy should face liability.  The 
first was to depict an ISP, like Prodigy, as closely analogous to a 
newspaper publisher, and as a publisher by virtue of its misfeasance-like 
involvement in doing things that bring an original author’s inscriptive 
utterances to the eyes of a third party.  Both Prodigy’s evidentiary 
admissions and its allegedly editorial activities stood as support for this 
view.203  A second was to view Prodigy as a property owner with special 
control over a surface and notice of the defamatory content on it; under 
section 577(2), such persons arguably have affirmative duties to remove 
defamatory statements made by others, and the failure to do so can subject 
one to defamation liability—in effect, substituting failure to remove for 
active publication, and thereby fulfilling the publication element.204  Third, 
even assuming there is, in general, no duty rooted in section 577(2), for an 
ISP to remove postings on its bulletin board, one could argue that 
undertaking to censor, remove, and protect the reputational victims itself 
generates an affirmative duty to do so.205 
Section 230(c)(1) is most plainly understood as a rejection of the 
central Stratton Oakmont idea that ISPs are like newspaper publishers, as 
Mr. Zeran contended.  Section 230(c)(2), as I have argued and as the “Good 
Samaritan” textual language makes amply clear, is at least in part about 
the impermissibility of inferring affirmative duties to delete from 
undertakings to censor and control.206  But an argument can be made that 
                                                
203 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (discussing Prodigy’s admissions). 
204 See supra Part III.A (referring to a property owner’s affirmative duty to remove 
defamatory content). 
205 My post-230, backward-looking enumeration of promising arguments for Stratton 
Oakmont here, is somewhat different from the enumeration offered in Part III.B, purporting 
to occupy Stratton Oakmont’s strategic perspective.  There, I suggested there were “three-
plus” routes to argue for publication: (1) newspaper publisher; (2) distributor; and (3 plus) 
affirmative duty, either as land/chattels owner or based on an undertaking to protect.  I 
suggested that the distributor argument was ruled out for Stratton Oakmont as strategically 
unappealing, because of Cubby (and because the facts did not support a distributor-like role, 
as they had in Cubby) and that Stratton Oakmont seems to have succeeded by a combination 
of the newspaper argument and the affirmative duty/undertaking argument.  In my post-
230 analysis, looking backwards at Stratton Oakmont, I arrive at the three “promising” routes 
by omitting the “distributor” argument—leaving the newspaper and the affirmative 
duty/undertaking argument, but breaking the latter into two.  Thus, the three routes are: (1) 
newspaper; (2) affirmative duty based on property/chattels ownership; and (3) affirmative 
duty based on special undertaking to protect or filter. 
206 For this reason, there is a powerful argument that Blumenthal v. Drudge was correctly 
decided in favor of AOL.  992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).  The United States District Court for 
the District of D.C. interpreted § 230(c)(1) to state that courts may not treat ISPs (like AOL, 
the defendant) as if they were newspaper publishers.  In Blumenthal, AOL was behaving 
exactly like a newspaper publisher with respect to a syndicated columnist.  It had a monthly 
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Zeran was about neither of these categories; it was about the second, 
special-control-over-chattels-based argument for an affirmative duty to 
remove.  That path to recovery at first appears not to have been addressed 
by (c)(1) or by (c)(2).  Because Mr. Zeran’s lawyer chose to frame his 
argument in terms of distributor-liability, rather than affirmative duty to 
remove, and because scores of scholars have followed Zeran’s parsing of 
the issues, courts and commentators in the United States have not 
addressed head-on the section 577(2) affirmative duty argument that does 
not depend on an undertaking.207  In other words, reading the two parts 
of § 230(c) separately seems to lead to the conclusion AOL has no defense 
against pre-Internet case law saying that there is a duty to remove, with 
notice, because one is the owner of the chattels or the property.208 
But, of course, there is no reason to read each of the two clauses 
separately; there is reason to read them together, in context, as Justice 
Antonin Scalia and a generation of textualist scholars have made clear.209  
They are both part of the same law, passed at the same time, in response 
to the same case, and dealing with a large and difficult question.210  As this 
Article has argued at length, both the text and the history of (c)(2) 
demonstrate that it says:  a failing affirmative duty argument for removal 
                                                
deal with the gossip columnist, Matthew Drudge, to carry his website-based gossip column 
on AOL for AOL subscribers.  The court in Blumenthal was arguably confronting an ISP that 
took an active step to post the column.  Nonetheless, Stratton Oakmont’s entire first half is so 
plausibly understood as a ruling that ISPs should be treated as newspaper publishers, that it 
is difficult to deny that § 230(c)(1) (expressly aimed at overruling Stratton Oakmont) is at least 
partially an effort to preempt the newspaper publisher analogy. 
207 But see Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).  The majority of the Florida 
Supreme Court fended off a critique of Zeran on textualist grounds by reasoning that all of 
Restatement (Second) § 577 pertained to the “publication” element, plausibly reasoning that 
the Restatement understands failure to remove (under section 577(2)) as one way of 
satisfying the publication element.  In this response—and especially in light of the dissenting 
justice’s “distributor”-based argument—the Doe court is among the few that takes seriously 
the failure-to-remove category, rather than the distributor category.  Nonetheless, Doe 
predates Batzel and other courts’ debates about the active/passive distinction and simply 
does not address the relevance of the affirmative duty categories for § 230 analysis.  
Additionally, because Doe involves asserted liability for harm caused by the posting of child 
pornography—and not libel—it is not clear whether the § 230 should apply at all.  Relatedly, 
there is reason to wonder whether the First Amendment arguments that might undercut 
notice-based distributor-based liability for libel (even absent § 230(c)) would, under common 
law and constitutional law, shield ISPs against distributor-liability in connection with child 
pornography. 
208 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
209 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 434–36 
(2005) (explaining the nature of textualists); see also Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia’s Equitable 
Constitution, 33 J.C. & U.L. 143, 144 (2007) (describing the reading process for constitutions 
and statutes). 
210 See Manning, supra note 209, at 434–36 (discussing the reasoning as to why statutory 
language is read by textualists). 
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will not be converted into a successful affirmative duty argument by 
adding that there was an undertaking to restrict or censor.  The starting 
assumption of that argument appears to be that there is no affirmative 
duty of ISPs (or their Board Leaders or hired monitors) to remove 
defamatory statements from their own websites; the failure to remove 
them cannot be taken as a basis for liability under section 577(2) 
(affirmative duty of owner or property or chattels to remove defamatory 
statement).  And so, one is led to ask whether there is anything in the text 
of § 230 that can be read as expressing that proposition. 
The answer is simply that the text of § 230(c)(1) is very naturally read 
as expressing that point:  “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”211  The question 
presented by Zeran is if a court imposes liability for reputational injury on an 
ISP for failure to remove a defamatory statement posted through its bulletin 
board, will that court count as having “treated” the ISP as a “publisher or 
speaker” of that statement?  Judge Wilkinson got the right answer to that 
question in Zeran:  a court that imposed liability under such circumstances 
would be violating § 230, and, therefore, state law is preempted to the 
extent that it does so.212 
It is therefore most plausible to read § 230(c)(1), when it demands of 
courts that they not “treat” an Internet service provider or user “as a 
publisher or speaker” of someone else’s posting, as meaning that it not 
hold them liable for failure to remove postings from their websites or 
bulletin board.213  That is part of what § 230(c)(1) forbids.  Because such a 
bald statement of no affirmative duty to protect, like tort law’s basic 
principles of no affirmative duty, leaves open the question of whether an 
undertaking to censor and monitor could generate an affirmative duty 
(and concomitant liability), § 230(c)(2) shuts the door on the undertaking-
based affirmative duty, too.  The Good Samaritan component of the 
legislative effort received top billing, presumably because the ISP industry 
rationally viewed Stratton Oakmont’s almost deliberate punitiveness 
toward “family-values” ISPs as the most powerful magnet for 
Congressional reform.214  Lobbyists for the industry prudently led with 
                                                
211 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
212 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 335. 
213 See id. at 330 (explaining that § 230 protects service providers from lawsuits if they 
should act as publishers). 
214 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01 (1995) (quoting Representative Christopher Cox’s 
testimony). 
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the Good Samaritan part, presumably aware that the more basic 
protection against liability for failure to remove would come in tow.215 
There is, arguably, a textual advantage to the reading of § 230(c)(1) as 
this Article is suggesting, even when the text of § 230(c)(1) is taken on its 
own.  Notwithstanding the preliminary interpretive hypothesis, the text 
of this section is not perfectly interpreted as a simple prohibition on 
classifying ISPs as “publishers” akin to newspaper publishers.  If that had 
been its sole point, it would have been more felicitous simply to state that 
an Internet service provider should not be treated as a “publisher.”  
Instead, it states that an ISP (or user) should not be treated as “the 
publisher or speaker [of any information provided by another information 
content provider].”  The latter two words—“or speaker”—appear 
extraneous.  If, however, the point of § 230(c)(1) is to block courts from 
saying that the “publication” element of a defamation claim is satisfied by 
an affirmative duty of a chattels owner to remove statements, then the 
phrase “publisher or speaker” makes sense.  That is because the 
publication element of a defamation claim is nicely captured by the 
requirement that the defendant have “written or spoken” defamatory 
words.  It is the element as a whole that § 230(c)(1) insists is unsatisfied by 
Internet service providers and users failing to remove a defamatory 
statement on a site over which they have control.  The point is that, in 
situations where such defamatory statements appear on a site over which 
they have control, the defendant’s control over the site does not provide a 
sufficient basis for treating the defendant as “the publisher or speaker” of 
the statements posted on it by third parties—in other words, as fulfilling 
the publication requirement of a defamation claim against the ISP or user, 
notwithstanding that the defamatory statements were actually made (posted) by 
third parties. 
Let us return to Zeran.  In his opinion, Judge Harvie Wilkinson 
reasoned that if ISPs were subject to notice-based liability for failure to 
remove defamatory statements: 
[T]hey would face potential liability each time they 
receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—
from any party, concerning any message.  Each 
notification would require a careful yet rapid 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the 
posted information, a legal judgment concerning the 
information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot 
                                                
215 See Melissa A. Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Law Should 
Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (2006) (explaining the lobbyist’s position 
on the Good Samaritan clause in regards to liability). 
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editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the 
continued publication of that information.  Although this 
might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the 
sheer number of postings on interactive computer 
services would create an impossible burden in the 
Internet context.216 
An interpretation leading to this result would frustrate Congressional 
purpose, he argued.  Judge Wilkinson’s statement is true, but it 
understates the strength of the interpretation and its fidelity to the text; as 
this Article has argued, the text of § 230 is best understood as ruling out 
the treatment of ISPs as having affirmative duties to filter or remove 
defamatory matter.217  Congress’s statement that ISPs should not be 
treated as publishers or speakers of statements by other content providers 
expresses the idea that the failure to filter or remove the other content, the 
provider’s statement shall not warrant treating the defendant as if she or he 
were the publisher or speaker of that statement in the traditional sense. 
On this account, then, section 1 of the Good Samaritan statute is broad 
because it prohibits:  (1) treating an ISP the same as courts would treat the 
publisher or speaker in-the-traditional-sense of a defamatory (or 
otherwise tortious) statement on the Internet; and (2) imposing liability on 
an Internet service provider or user by virtue of the failure to comply with 
an affirmative duty to remove others’ statements.  Section 2 is in one way 
narrower and in one way broader.  It is narrower because it relates only to 
the “undertaking” line of plaintiff argument, and it is broader because it 
goes beyond the phrase “publisher or speaker,” and simply asserts that 
liability should not be imposed on this basis. In this way, section 2 makes 
especially clear that a particular kind of argument for generating an 
affirmative duty is preempted. 
It is understandable that Mr. Zeran’s lawyer ran a distributor 
argument against AOL in Zeran, because § 230(c)(1) (if one overlooks the 
words “or speaker”) appears to overrule Stratton Oakmont by declaring 
that ISPs are not to be treated like newspaper publishers.  Because 
distributors were distinct from publishers and were allegedly deemed to 
have some duties to remove postings, and because § 230 does not address 
distributors, it was palatable to suggest that § 230 leaves open the 
possibility of distributor liability.  Judge Wilkinson was inclined to regard 
this argument as wrongheaded, believing that the legislation should be 
understood as having done more than eliminate pure publisher liability. 
                                                
216 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 
217 See supra Part III.C. 
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Judge Wilkinson’s pro-ISP inclination was sound, as was his actual 
decision in Zeran, but the distributor argument was a distraction.  Zeran 
was asking the District Court to impose liability upon AOL because of its 
failure to remove the post defaming him from AOL’s bulletin board.  
Nothing about what AOL did was like the action of a distributor; AOL 
provided the substratum or chattels through which another person 
posted, but it did not itself choose to post anything.  Zeran was effectively 
asking the court to apply failure-to-remove liability, as in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 577(2).  As we have seen, § 230(c)(1) should be 
read as denying the existence of a quasi-property-based affirmative duty 
to remove postings.  Not only does the text of (c)(1) support that reading, 
it is only against that backdrop that the Good Samaritan provision of 
§ 230(c)(2) makes sense.  It would make no sense to say that undertaking 
or volunteering to filter does not alter the background rule of no-
affirmative duty, unless it was first established that there was no baseline 
affirmative duty to remove or basis of liability involved in being a 
provider or user of the Internet service through which the defamatory 
statement was posted by another. 
It appears, however, that Judge Wilkinson did not see this argument.  
He therefore read the statute according to his understanding of its broader 
purpose of enhancing free speech, as preempting tort claims against those 
who engage in the act of distributing defamatory statements.  The 
distinction between distributor-based liability with notice and chattels-
owner based liability for failure to remove was immaterial for the 
purposes of Zeran; the Fourth Circuit reached the right result.  But the 
distinction came to be important because subsequent cases forced courts 
to confront the question of what—in light of the statute—was defective 
about a claim like Zeran’s.  The correct answer, this Article has argued, is 
that Congress wished to deny that failure to remove from one’s property 
(or chattels or space) should count as fulfilling the publication element of 
a libel claim, in the context of the Internet.  Lacking this answer, 
subsequent courts have been drawn to the idea that because someone else 
was the author of the content, the ISP or user cannot be held liable for 
publishing the content.  This ultimately led courts down the path of 
thinking that § 230 repeals the republication rule. 
IV.  BATZEL REVISITED 
A. The Active/Passive Distinction 
Both the Ninth Circuit in Batzel and the California Supreme Court in 
Barrett were required to deal with the fact that the key defendants in their 
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respective cases were individuals, not ISPs or even websites.218  Both 
rightly noted that the CDA refers to “internet service providers and users,” 
and in so doing, rules out any interpretation limited to ISPs.219  Because 
§ 230 appears to address a targeted problem relating principally to ISPs 
and website hosts, the generality is a bit puzzling.220  Batzel pointed out 
that a non-ISP (e.g., a website owner or, as in Stratton Oakmont, a putative 
independent contractor hired to monitor the ISP) might engage in 
censorship or screening or take-down efforts, and, therefore, find herself 
being treated by the jurisdiction as a publisher, were the statute worded 
only to shield ISPs.221 
The larger question in both cases is whether the posting on bulletin 
boards or listserves by the individual defendant is shielded from liability 
by § 230.  Batzel’s argument for liability was simple:  Cremers libeled her 
by e-mailing and posting around a letter stating that she was Himmler’s 
descendant who secretly possessed art that Nazis had looted from Jews.222  
Under the law of libel, given the republication rule, the fact that the letter 
was composed by Smith does not undercut Batzel’s claim that Cremers 
libeled her, for Cremers in fact published Smith’s letter (in the traditional 
sense of “publish”) by circulating it and posting it. 
Cremers successfully argued that § 230 preempted Batzel’s claim on 
the ground that imposing liability here would be treating an Internet 
service user as a publisher of information provided by another 
information content provider (Smith), and, therefore, contravening 
§ 230(c)(1).  Here is how the majority—which adopted Cremers’s 
position—characterized the dissent’s position and responded to it: 
The partial dissent . . . simultaneously maintains that 1) a 
defendant who takes an active role in selecting 
information for publication is not immune; and 2) 
interactive computer service users and providers who 
screen the material submitted and remove offensive 
content are immune.  These two positions simply cannot 
logically coexist. 
                                                
218 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (establishing the defendant 
Rosenthal as a director for the Humantics Foundation for Woman and operator of an Internet 
discussion group); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (introducing 
the defendant, Cremers, as a specialist in museum security). 
219 See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 515 (referring to the text used by § 230(c)(1)); see also Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1037 (discussing the language used in § 230 (c)(1)). 
220 See § 230 (underscoring problems that may arise with website hosts and the like). 
221 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029. 
222 Id. at 1021.  
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 Such a distinction between deciding to publish only 
some of the material submitted and deciding not to 
publish some of the material submitted is not a viable one. 
The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the 
publisher approaches the selection process as one of 
inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method 
or degree, not substance.223 
For several reasons, the majority is too quick to accept Cremers’s 
critique.  First, the court’s framing of the issue actually begs a key 
question: whether a defendant’s failure to remove a defamatory posting 
can itself count as publishing.  “Such a distinction between deciding to 
publish only some of the material submitted and deciding not to publish 
some of the material submitted is not a viable one.”224  The problem is in 
the parallel phrases “deciding to publish only some” and “deciding not to 
publish some . . . .”225  Those phrases—and the entire sentence—are 
implicit versions of the following:  Such a distinction between deciding to 
publish only some of the material submitted (and not to publish the remainder) 
and deciding not to publish some of the material submitted (but to publish the 
remainder) is not a viable one.  The argument, in other words, presupposes 
that both sides of the comparison involve publishing some and declining 
to publish the remainder.  It therefore seems preposterous to think that 
there is a difference in the order of how it is phrased. 
The problem is that the dissent is not arguing for this distinction, but 
for a different one—a distinction between choosing to post (some, but not all, 
of the material written by third parties) and declining to remove (some, but not 
all, of the material written by third parties).  The majority simply assumes that 
“declining to remove” what is posted on one’s website is a form of 
publication and that what both sides of the majority’s supposedly false 
contrast are assumed to be forms of “publishing” third party content.  
Since there is, as the dissent recognizes, no liability under § 230 for the 
second side of the contrast (what the majority describes as “deciding not 
to publish some of the material submitted,” and implicitly deciding to 
publish the remainder by failing to remove it), there cannot be liability on 
the first side of the contrast: deciding to publish some (by posting). 
Now we are at the nub of the difficulty.  This Article’s central 
interpretive claim is that § 230(c) specifically rejects the idea that declining 
to remove a posting shall count as publishing.  Yet the majority in Batzel 
begins with the assumption that declining to remove is publishing.  That is 
                                                
223 Id. at 1032 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
224 Id. (emphasis in original). 
225 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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why courts employing broadly pro-defendant interpretations are inclined 
to speak of a § 230 “immunity” as if there is a special sort of affirmative 
defense or shield against what otherwise is a well-formed prima facie 
claim.  The plaintiff’s whole point is to argue against that equivalence.  
Perhaps the argument does not succeed, but the majority needs to show 
that it does not succeed; to begin by merely assuming that failure to 
remove is a form of publication is viciously circular.  That is what the 
Ninth Circuit majority does (and then says there is immunity for 
publishing something if it was penned by someone else originally). 
Second, the court is making plain its contempt for an active/passive 
distinction and suggesting that it is sort of a fabrication of the dissent.226  
But active/passive distinctions are all over the law—for better or worse—
and they are indeed central to the black letter law of libel, especially 
regarding the publication element.227 
Third, the account the Article offered above—stretching from Cubby 
to Stratton Oakmont and § 230’s enactment to Zeran—of course suggests 
that preempting passive, affirmative-duty-based liability was precisely 
what § 230 was aimed at doing and it explains why.  The common law for 
very basic reasons holds those who publish defamatory statements liable 
for their intentional acts of defaming, and it sweeps in actors as part of the 
agency of publishing.  No communication happens and no defamation 
occurs without the voluntary act of publishing.  For powerful reasons 
relating to responsibility, choice, and freedom, the common law does not 
treat failure to remove what someone else has published, or failure to 
screen out what someone else has published, as a general basis for liability 
(although, as discussed, there can be exceptions).  These are the same 
reasons that we treat shooting someone differently from failing to stop the 
bullet or failing to rescue the victim.  To be pluralistic about it, some 
reasons relate to basic notions of agency and responsibility; some relate to 
libertarian notions of freedom; some relate to floodgates concerns; some 
relate to compliance costs.228 
The lawyers for Stratton Oakmont, picking up on a line of thinking in 
the legal literature and on overly aggressive marketing statements by 
Prodigy, crafted an interesting common law argument for changing the 
default rule of no liability for failure to remove without notice; the 
undertaking of screening and removal creates an actionable duty to screen 
                                                
226 See id. at 1038. 
227 See supra Part II.A. 
228 Cf. Myriam Gilles, The Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 65 GA. L. REV. 845, 857 (2001) (discussing qualified immunity and 
distinguishing negligence torts, which have high compliance costs, from intentional torts, 
which have low compliance costs). 
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or remove.  Combined with a Restatement section 577 argument that 
property or chattel owners have duties to remove when they are aware of 
the defamatory content of what they are publishing, plaintiffs seemed 
poised to convince courts around the country to elide the active/passive 
distinction and hold ISPs liable for failure to screen or failure to remove.  
As demonstrated in Part III, the very point of the CDA was to preempt 
state courts who wished to elide this distinction in this clever manner.  To 
do so would be to obliterate the massively important distinction between 
monitoring oneself so that one does not utter or write defamatory 
statements, on the one hand, and monitoring the statements of everyone 
else in the world to decide whether their statements must be blocked or 
removed.  Congress saw not only that such an obliteration would be unfair 
to ISPs, but also that it would incentivize massive overscreening, and 
therefore, be a free speech problem.229 
Batzel was mistaken in supposing the active/passive distinction 
illogical; mistaken in supposing it fabricated, mistaken in supposing it 
unmotivated, and mistaken in thinking the distinction alien from 
Congress’s intentions.230  Section 230—as its name “Good Samaritan 
protection” indicates—is all about telling states that they may not 
recognize liability predicated on breach of a duty to screen or remove; ISP 
screening and removing is incentivized by rendering it a no-liability 
activity.  It has nothing to do with active posting of materials online. 
B. Some Causes of the Batzel Error 
Assuming for the moment that this Article is correct in its critique of 
the Batzel majority, how could it be that nearly all of the serious federal 
and state judges to have addressed the same issue continue to get it wrong, 
and why has the problem not been exposed?  Possibly, the deepest causes 
of the error are jurisprudential; indeed, that will be the topic of Part V of 
this Article, but at least three other facets of the legal setting deserve 
discussion:  one relating to the statutory language of § 230(c)(1), one 
relating to a kind of screening issue that arises in some § 230 cases, and 
one relating to the republication rule and the common law background. 
1. Statutory Language 
The language of § 230(c)(1) is mandatory and categorical, and 
Cremers’s argument appeared to fit it perfectly:  “No provider or user of 
                                                
229 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (providing that Congress 
implemented § 230 to reduce infringement on freedom of speech). 
230 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (explaining Congress did not require the distinction in § 230 
to be present). 
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an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider.”231  
Cremers was a “user of an interactive computer service”; if the Ninth 
Circuit had permitted the District Court to hold him liable for libel, that 
court would have been treating him “as the publisher of information 
provided by” Smith, who was indeed another information provider.  
Therefore, a textualist argument seems to be a clean winner for Cremers. 
The problem with this argument form is that it proves too much—far 
too much.  No one would have argued that Cremers would be immune if 
he had published the contents of Smith’s letter in the New York Times’s 
hard copy version, but all of the above statements would still be true.  The 
overbreadth of this interpretation is not cured by saying that it involves 
only putative publication on the Internet.  There is another problem, 
which is that the word “information” is quite naturally interpreted as 
meaning the factual content of what the other said, not whether the other 
said it, and nothing in the statute requires any attribution to the other 
content provider in order to obtain freedom from liability.  If Cremers, 
going on the information provided by Smith (but with no express 
attribution), had written on the Internet “Batzel is Himmler’s descendent 
and owns a great deal of Nazi looted art,” he still would have come within 
the text of § 230(c)(1), so interpreted, for the information would still have 
been provided by another information content provider.  Therefore, the 
seemingly straightforward textual reading suggested in the prior 
paragraph cannot be right. 
It is tempting to suppose—based on these examples—that the statute 
is simply poorly drafted.  But there is a much more plausible way to 
understand it, which lies in the word “treated”; indeed, how courts are 
and are not to “treat” ISPs is the central focus of this section of the Article.  
The basic idea was that ISPs—which are not in fact publishers in any 
straightforward sense, but more like common carriers—should not be 
treated as if they were publishers.  If an ISP—Google, Inc., for example—
were to make a false and defamatory public statement about one of its 
executives based on information a private detective had revealed to it, 
Google could certainly be held liable in a libel claim (notwithstanding 
§ 230), even if doing so would involve treating Google, Inc. as a publisher 
or speaker.  That would be because Google, Inc. is a publisher or speaker 
in conventional terms, in that hypothetical.  Section 230(c)(1) contemplates 
a state or federal court that treats an ISP as a publisher or speaker, 
notwithstanding its not being one in conventional terms.  Doing that is 
what a court “shall not” do under § 230(c)(1). 
                                                
231 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
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It is a truism that certain legal problems that legislatures might wish 
to solve end up leading to drafting that has the capacity to mislead 
seriously.  Here are two similar, hypothetical, examples:   
Consider a statute that reads a certain way (in italics) and an 
apparently sound but actually fallacious textual argument in quotation 
marks: 
(1) No medical radiologic technologist shall be treated as an 
expert for the purposes of giving testimony on the standard of 
care in a medical malpractice case. 
“Jones is a medical radiologic technologist, and therefore 
may not serve as an expert witness on the standard of care 
in this case, which is a medical malpractice case.”  The 
argument is fallacious if Jones is also a licensed physician 
with expertise on the standard of care pertinent to the 
case at bar. 
OR 
(2) No automobile rental company shall be treated as a product-
seller for purposes of products liability law. 
Hertz is an automobile rental company, and therefore 
cannot be held liable in a products liability case based on 
a rental car that injured the plaintiff.  The argument is 
fallacious if Hertz has created a subsidiary that is actually 
a retailer of new automobiles, and the plaintiff was 
injured by such an automobile. 
 
The general form is: 
 
No member of class C shall be treated as having the attribute 
Alpha for the purposes of body of law Beta.   
Such statutes can be interpreted in a range of ways.  At one end of the 
range is:  Sufficient for exclusion:  If a person or a company is a member of 
class C, then, for that very reason, courts interpreting the body of law Beta may 
not treat that person or company as having the attribute Alpha, under body of law 
Beta.  At the other end of the range is:  Rejection of inclusion criterion:  Body 
of law Beta shall not be interpreted in such a way that membership in class C is 
grounds for treating a person or company as having attribute Alpha, under body 
of law Beta. 
In both examples (1) and (2) above, it would very likely be wrong to 
read the statute as containing a criterion that is, in and of itself, sufficient 
for exclusion from treatment as having Alpha, and it would much likelier 
make sense to see the statute as rejecting a certain kind of criterion as a 
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primary basis for inclusion in treatment as having Alpha.  These examples 
are quite simple, and I am of course assuming that there was context in 
each of my examples—textual, historical, or otherwise that would make 
clear why the “rejection of inclusion criterion” reading was better (in (1), 
I imagine a doctor’s lobby persuading a state legislature that the barrier 
for counting as an expert in medical malpractice cases was getting too low 
and insufficiently attentive to norms of care among physicians; in (2), I 
imagine a trend of plaintiffs’ lawyers trying to circumvent negligence law 
standards in litigation against rental companies who rent defective cars 
and a legislature blocking the trend). 
Taken to the CDA, the point is as follows:  there is no basis for 
interpreting the statute to read that being an Internet service provider or user 
is sufficient to exclude a defendant from being potentially liable for republishing 
someone else’s statements, rather than reading it to say that being the service 
or medium through which it was posted (or having control over the service or 
medium through which it was posted by another) shall not be a basis for treating 
the ISP (or user) as a publisher—i.e., deeming the publication element satisfied  
The name and repeated usage of the phrase “Good Samaritan,” the 
express reference to Stratton Oakmont, the common law background, the 
legislative history, and the canon of reading narrowly statutes in 
derogation of the common law—all cut in favor of the second reading and 
against the first. 
Here, as elsewhere, courts must interpret the statute as a whole.232 
2. Screening Protection 
According to § 230(c)(2): 
[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of (A) any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable . . . .233 
In Donato v. Moldow, the New Jersey Appellate Division confronted a 
claim against the operator of a website who edited a third party’s 
defamatory content in such a way as to diminish its profanity, then 
                                                
232 See Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442–43 (2014) (establishing when 
interpreting text, the statute must be read as a whole); see also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 
S. Ct. 1068, 1082  (2011). 
233 § 230 (c)(2). 
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reposted the edited post.234  The defendant operator argued that to hold 
him liable for reposting what was done in the service of screening out 
profanity was to violate § 230(c)(2), which seems to be devoted to 
encouraging web users to do some censoring or editing of profanities.235  
Although Batzel was decided before Donato, and relied upon within it, an 
aspect of the decision contemplated that Smith had sent Cremers his e-
mail for the purpose of having it posted, and that Cremers simply served 
as an intermediary who did some good faith editing.236  Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit actually remanded Batzel’s claim to the District Court to ascertain 
whether this was true, in other words, whether Cremers was simply an 
intermediary who performed a good faith editing function.237  The case 
lost on summary judgment because of unrelated procedural difficulties 
faced by Batzel.238 
In the end, this line of argument—which also appears in Shiamili and 
Jones—is largely unpersuasive in the vast majority of cases in which it 
appears (including Batzel, Donato, and Shiamili), and is probably quite 
irrelevant in any event to the current state of the law.239  The California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Barrett simply did not carry this “editor” 
feature; Rosenthal was not using her own website, and the unanimous 
court did not even notice the difference.240  In Batzel, it was clear that even 
if Cremers did post the Smith letter on his own website, in edited form, he 
                                                
234 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 713–15 (N.J. Super. 2005). 
235 See § 230(c)(2) (permitting editing and restricting materials on a good faith basis without 
implication of liability). 
236 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding the publisher 
should be potentially liable because he published defamatory statements made by third 
parties and “a reasonable person in the position of the service provider or user would 
conclude that the information was provided for publication on the Internet or other 
‘interactive computer service’”); see also, e.g., Donato, 865 A.2d at 718 (showing state courts 
should give considerable weight to federal decisions when interpreting federal statutes). 
237 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035. 
238 See Batzel v. Smith, 372 F. Supp. 2d 546, 546 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting summary 
judgment on res judicata, because of dismissal for failure to prosecute in parallel North 
Carolina action). 
239 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 396, 415–17 (6th Cir. 
2014) (holding that immunity is triggered when a service provider exercises a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (concluding no provider or user of an 
interactive computer service can be treated as the publisher provided by another content 
provider); Donato, 865 A.2d at 718 (reiterating that state courts should give regard to federal 
decisions when interpreting federal statutes); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17 
N.Y.3d 281, 286–87 (N.Y. 2011) (explaining that a publisher of defamatory material authored 
by a third party is generally subject to tort liability, but there is an exception in which the 
defendant is an information content provider). 
240 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526, 528–29 (Cal. 2006) (reiterating that Congress 
intended active users on the Internet to be immune from tort liability because of their 
freedom to actively post material on the Internet). 
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also passed the email and the email’s information to other persons via 
other means, so the conduit argument fails.241  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the statutory language follows typical Good Samaritan 
statutes by including a “good faith” requirement.242  Plausible and 
evidence-backed contentions that the website operators intentionally, 
recklessly, maliciously, or knowingly made defamatory and false 
statements quite easily create an issue as to “good faith,” notwithstanding 
the Donato court’s dismissive comments to the contrary.243 
3. Established Modes of Cabining the Republication Rule 
In the third place, a common misreading of § 230 appears to draw 
from the fair reporting privilege and other sources of legal doctrine 
unrelated to the CDA.244  The rule sometimes appears harsh, unjust, and 
indefensible—a point most eloquently and powerfully expressed by the 
Second Circuit’s famous decision in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 
Inc.245  Edwards utilized the First Amendment to fashion what it called the 
“neutral reportage privilege,” which essentially created a space of no 
liability when a responsible speaker accurately conveyed the gist of a 
defamatory statement by another person, perhaps a public figure, at least 
where the fact of the third party’s utterance was itself a matter of 
legitimate public concern.246  Although Edwards has never been endorsed 
by the Supreme Court and has received a mixed reception, nationally, it 
                                                
241 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022 (observing that Cremers included the message in emails to 
several persons). 
242 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith”) (emphasis added). 
243 See Donato, 865 A.2d at 727 (addressing the “good faith” requirement of the good 
Samaritan provision).  The Court addressed the appellant’s argument based on the 
following: 
In our view, appellants’ argument rests on a misconception about the 
purpose of the good samaritan provision.  It was inserted not to 
diminish the broad general immunity provided by § 230(c)(1), but to 
assure that it not be diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher 
functions.  If the conduct falls within the scope of the traditional 
publisher’s functions, it cannot constitute, within the context of 
§ 230(c)(2)(A), bad faith. 
Id.  The failure of the New Jersey court to take seriously the role of “good faith” in Good 
Samaritan statutes generally is quite striking. 
244 See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 1 
§ 7.3 (4th ed. 2014) (explaining “Limitations on and Exceptions to Liability” under 
republication doctrine). 
245 See 556 F.2d 113, 122–23 (2nd Cir. 1977).  
246 See id. at 120 (explaining that personal attacks against a public figure will not be able to 
be immune under neutral reportage). 
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echoes a common law or statutory privilege that exists in many 
jurisdictions:  the fair-and-accurate reporting privilege.247  The privilege 
typically states that a newspaper or news source may publish “fair and 
accurate reports of certain defined judicial, legislative, and executive 
proceedings.”248  Both neutral reportage and fair reporting are very 
limited, and each requires an accurate and balanced report, as well as 
many other features.249  Anything beyond the accurate and balanced 
report will normally defeat the privilege.250  As a matter of practice, 
however, courts adjudicating such cases are typically going to focus on 
what differences exist, if any, between the statement by the third party 
and the statement by the defendant. For the reasons explained below, a 
defamatory-difference-in-content test seems to have caught on in CDA 
case law. 
Section 230(f)(3) states that “[t]he term ‘information content provider’ 
means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.”  Following Judge Frank 
Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit, many jurisdictions have taken 
§ 230(f)(3) in conjunction with § 230(c)(1) to entail that an ISP or user is not 
the publisher of a statement made by a third party unless the defamatory 
content was provided in significant part by the ISP or user herself.251  That 
is, whatever was provided in whole by the third party is something of 
which the ISP or user cannot be considered a “publisher.”252  With this 
argument in mind, a thoughtful line of cases now looks at whether the 
republisher has added independent content; in this case, there can be 
liability that is not for information content supplied by a third party, but 
                                                
247 See SACK, supra note 244, at § 7.3.5.D.3, at 7-50 (“lower state and federal courts, the 
reception has been generally favorable but not unmixed”); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1976) (providing that a publication of defamatory matter is 
privileged if “the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence 
reported”); Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. 
248 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 § 8:66 (2d ed. 2010). 
249 See id. at 2 § 8:67 (explaining the fair reporting privilege is more often than not 
considered an exemption to the common law republication rule). 
250 See id. (expanding on the concept that the neutral reporting privilege and fair reporting 
privileges are exceptions to the normal common law position of the republication rule 
because of the public’s interest to know about fair and accurate reporting). 
251 See § 230(f)(3) (establishing the definition of who is considered an information content 
provider); § 230(c)(1) (explaining the treatment to publishers and speakers); Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(describing the limitations on how someone can be immune from tort liability). 
252 See Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 at 671–72 (stating the stipulations of § 230(c)(1), which 
provide that a messenger cannot be sued simply because a message depicts a third party’s 
plan related to unlawful discriminatory practices). 
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supplied by the defendant independently.253  In my view, part of the 
success of the mistaken interpretation of the CDA is that it does provide 
courts with a cogent and comprehensible test in an Internet libel case, one 
that is accompanied by the perhaps familiar sense that one is doing a fair 
and accurate reporting type of analysis.254 
The central error in this argument is the one that Part IV.A identifies 
and Part IV.B.1 deepens.  Section 230 is not about the impermissibility of 
treating speakers as publishers when they are in fact simply acting as 
publishers in the traditional sense.  To think otherwise is to suppose that 
the CDA was put forward to undo the republication rule for the Internet 
at a wholesale level.  There is simply nothing in the statute’s text or 
legislative history that suggests that it has anything to do with an effort to 
eliminate liability for republishing.  Indeed, we have seen that taking the 
statute in this way is something of a blunder, for the real issue is not 
whether an ISP will be on the hook as a republisher, but whether the 
original publication by a third party will somehow be a publication for 
which the ISP is held responsible by virtue of providing the medium or 
failing to remove it.  Republication liability is certainly an interesting, 
important, and potentially controversial topic, but it is not what § 230 is 
about.255  The fact that § 230 expressly aimed to change the result in 
                                                
253 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to extend immunity to a federal housing discrimination claim).  
Roommates.com famously declines to interpret § 230 as undercutting a federal housing 
discrimination claim, finding that the website’s involvement was sufficient to overcome the 
statutory shield.  See id. (analyzing a website’s immunity under § 230).  By contrast, while the 
District Court in Jones found that the website owner’s involvement and commentary were 
sufficient to overcome § 230, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court as a matter of law 
on this issue.  See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415–17 
(demonstrating why Dirty World and Richie did not materially contribute to the illegality of 
the defamation statements towards Jones). 
254 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (explaining a website operator who changes user-
created content holds onto his immunity for anything illegal in the user-created content, as 
long as the edits are unrelated to the illegality). 
255 See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669–70 (explaining the controversies and issues that have 
influenced § 230(c)).  Judge Easterbrook’s well-known Craigslist opinion expressly draws 
from his own influential opinion in Doe v. GTE Corp.  See id. at 669 (citing Doe v. GTE Corp.)  
That opinion surprisingly fails to take seriously the odd structure of duty-to-
rescue/nonfeasance law that lies behind Good Samaritan statutes: 
If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent 
to the content of information they host or transmit:  whether they do 
(subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is 
no liability under either state or federal law.  As precautions are costly, 
not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered 
customers, ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and 
enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1).  Yet § 230(c)—which is, recall, part of 
the “Communications Decency Act”—bears the title “Protection for 
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material”, hardly 
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Stratton Oakmont simply does not entail that it addressed the question of 
republication; it did not.  To abrogate a common-law principle, the statute 
must “speak directly” to the question addressed by the common law.256 
Indeed, the Internet is such an amazing tool for broad dissemination 
that it would be a particularly bizarre policy judgment to eliminate the 
republication rule for the Internet, but for no other medium.  Do we really 
think Congress meant to say that, while republication of defamatory 
material in print or by word of mouth remains actionable, any 
republication over the Internet is not?  If this were the best reading of 
§ 230, we would find a way to live with it or perhaps amend it, but it is 
not the best reading; it is a reading that relies upon a reductive and 
incomplete picture of the legal domain into which § 230 was expressly 
placed. 
V.  LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE COMMON LAW 
Beyond the considerations mentioned above, Batzel perhaps displays 
a tendency to suppose that distinctions like active/passive and concepts 
like that of “publication” have no real normative work to do—that, in the 
end, it is a question of whether we value free speech more than protecting 
reputation in a given context.  Tort law—including libel law—is not so 
blunt.  It does not simply weigh one person’s demand for compensation 
against expected policy results.  It looks at who has done what to whom, 
but there is nuance in the “who,” in what they have “done” to someone, 
and to “whom,” and in what sense they have “done” that.  All of this goes 
into whether the legal system is willing to allow an aggrieved person to 
hold another accountable for wronging her or him.  The who, the how, 
and the whom are not of course decided as a one-shot deal; they are 
                                                
an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing 
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their 
services.  Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the 
creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of 
tortious or criminal conduct? 
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 The account I have provided in the text answers Judge Frank Easterbrook’s question.  
The point of Section 1 is to confirm the baseline nonfeasance/misfeasance rule for 
defamation and the Internet, and to ensure that there is no duty-to-remove based on the 
capacity to remove, the ownership of the chattels through which it is posted, or the common 
carrier function.  Section 2 is designed to ensure that the default no-duty/no liability rule is 
not changed by a practice of censorship.  Section 230(c)(2) is not about liability to those whose 
postings are removed, but about liability to those who are defamed (or otherwise injured) by 
virtue of what a third party posted. 
256 See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (arguing that the terminology used 
in the statute must adhere to common law standards to be utilized with common law 
standards). 
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decided according to a set of categories and principles in the legal system 
that, roughly speaking, coalesce into a set of rules.  The system is not clear-
cut, however, and the rules are changeable, both by courts and by 
legislatures. 
Part of what might be called, if somewhat pretentiously, “the 
normative theory of adjudication in the common law,” is stating what sort 
of approach judges should employ when trying to adjust the common law 
to new circumstances, including new technologies.  In the twentieth 
century, a certain brand of Legal Realism derived from one version of 
Holmes has clearly led the way in torts.  On this view, legal categories and 
concepts are overwhelmingly likely to be convenient instruments for 
pursuing policy goals more effectively and efficiently.  Indeed, on this 
view, which is sometimes referred to as “Reductive Instrumentalism,” 
legal concepts are best understood by grasping how they directly and 
indirectly serve the goals the law is seeking.  A good judge trying to decide 
how to extend a legal concept or principle will mainly be aiming to see 
what impact that concept has on the basic policy aims of the law, then 
applying the concept in a manner that faithfully pursues those policy aims 
under the new circumstances. 
A person who saw legal actors making reductive instrumental choices 
would see things this way:  In Stratton Oakmont, the question of whether 
Prodigy was a publisher was essentially equivalent—for Justice Ain—to 
the question of whether the prevention of reputational harm and the 
compensation of those reputationally harmed would be effectively 
pursued by holding Prodigy responsible as publisher.  The alleged 
unfairness of imposing such liability and responsibility on Prodigy was, 
in effect, blunted by Prodigy’s own boasting about its capacities to 
monitor.257  It was as if Prodigy set itself up to be selected as the cheapest 
cost avoider.258  The questions of whether Stratton Oakmont’s suit fulfilled 
the publication requirement and whether Prodigy was a publisher, are 
essentially answered by reverse engineering from this set of policy 
preferences. 
On this instrumentalist understanding, Congress weighed in with the 
CDA, and because, as an institutional matter and a constitutional matter, 
Congress’s preferences trump, its evaluation displaced the rule in Stratton 
Oakmont and other courts applying state law.  And its evaluation was that 
the compensation and deterrence values are outweighed by the free 
speech values.  Therefore, ISPs and users are not to be held liable for the 
defamatory statements of others.  In Batzel, there is a formal difference 
                                                
257 Supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
258 Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (setting forth cheapest-cost-
avoider theory of tort law). 
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between whether the defendant placed or removed others’ defamatory 
statements, but the difference is neither here nor there from a 
compensation, deterrence, and incentives point of view, as Justice Ain 
thought, and the free speech trumping announced by Congress is still the 
biggest value out there. 
Needless to say, I think this chronology is at once accurate and self-
condemning.  It was quite aggressive and counterintuitive to hold that 
Prodigy would be liable for Stratton Oakmont’s reputational injury, 
because it made no sense to say that Prodigy was the publisher of those 
reputational attacks, especially as a matter of law.  Conversely, Congress 
may have gone overboard when it explained that ISPs and their users may 
never be held responsible for the statements that third parties have posted 
and may never be liable for the damage caused by such statements.  
Certainly, Zeran’s result was harsh, and AOL’s conspicuous failure to take 
responsibility for an ongoing character assassination that it could have 
stopped was disconcerting, but it is plausible that the statute meant to 
foreclose that sort of liability.259  Yet, by Batzel and Barrett, we have come 
full circle.  The defendants in those cases were actually posting 
defamatory statements about the plaintiffs—spreading reputational harm 
by voluntary intentional actions of communication to third parties.260  The 
thing Stratton Oakmont pretended that Prodigy was doing—actually 
publishing something negative about it—is exactly what Cremers and 
Rosenthal were doing in those cases. 
There is a jurisprudential lesson to be drawn from this story.261  Legal 
concepts and legal principles have content.  They are not always rightly 
used and they are not always comfortable, but they aspire to track 
perfectly sensible moral concepts and principles that are largely workable 
in daily life.  We hold other people responsible for what they have done, 
for ways they have hurt us, and we act with the understanding that others 
may hold us responsible, too.  The common law developed in tandem with 
                                                
259 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing there 
would be public policy concerns if service providers were subject to distributor liability). 
260 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Smith emailed 
the Director of Security at Amsterdam’s Rijksmuseum about Ellen Batzel having hundreds 
of European paintings that were looted during World War II, and then Cremers published 
Smith’s email to the Museum Security Network); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513–14 
(Cal. 2006) (discussing Rosenthal republished various messages about the plaintiffs, even 
after Rosenthal was told they were false). 
261 See Zipursky, Pragmatic, supra note 4, at 458–59 (explaining how conceptualistic analysis 
of law is consistent with philosophical pragmatism and the rejection of formalism). 
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these non-legal concepts of responsibility, and these non-legal concepts of 
responsibility continue to evolve.262 
Of course, the CDA cases we have reviewed are not exactly cases in 
the common law of torts; they are statutory interpretation cases, rightly 
rooted in text and purpose more than in common law concepts.  We have 
already seen, however, that untutored textual interpretation and 
simplistic, goal-centered purposive interpretation can easily go awry.  A 
statutory idea that is inserted into an area of state common law should of 
course be read with a background framework for the common law, and 
that is what I—as a scholar of the common law of torts—have tried to 
provide.  When we understand the affirmative duty and ‘commenced 
rescue’ ideas that come from the common law of negligence, the Good 
Samaritan statutes used to adjust that law, and the analogous 
misfeasance/nonfeasance that arise in libel law, we arrive closer to the 
common law sophistication that being a good interpreter requires. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The task of a common law judge crafting legal concepts and principles 
is to get the hang of what they mean and also to think sensibly and 
pragmatically about how the legal concepts and principles can be applied 
moving forward.  But thinking pragmatically does not mean thinking 
instrumentally in a manner that simply contemplates a reductive 
conception of social goals.  Rather, the common law judge must think 
pragmatically without losing a grip on the concepts and principles; 
indeed, thinking pragmatically is typically an integral part of deploying 
the concepts and principles well.  And—as cases from Zeran to Barrett 
indicate—an understanding of how statutory law fits with the common 
law will typically require a supple and pragmatic grasp of the concepts 
within the common law, too. 
The common law of torts is in principle, available to protect 
individuals against every level of injury, and—as New York Times v. 
Sullivan and its progeny have shown—can be ratcheted up and down 
depending on our perceptions of the social costs of liability.  Twenty-two 
years ago, a patently criminal enterprise—Stratton Oakmont—filed a silly 
libel suit in a Long Island state court, and a local judge threw caution to 
the wind and let the case proceed.  Fortunately, the United States Congress 
inserted a protective provision into federal law that ensured such 
decisions would not chill the development of Internet speech by rendering 
                                                
262 See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY, IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (J. Oberdiek ed., 2014) (analyzing place of 
responsibility in tort law). 
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ISPs’ deep pockets for a million slights per hour.  But, nothing in that law 
said “all speech tort law stops here,” and Congress knew then what we all 
know now—that the world of the Internet would develop in ways then 
unimaginable.  This is just the sort of change that calls for thoughtful 
interpretation, not total immunity. 
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